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A b s t r a c t
The study examines the socio-historical dynamics of the border region 
between the Philippines and Indonesia. These dynamics are viewed, in 
particular, on the experiences and history of the Sangir-Talauds whose 
personal and community histories traverse both sides of the border. The 
study addresses the questions: how did the construction of the modern 
nation-state and border redefine the dynamics and locations of people 
within a border region? How were the barriers erected as result of nation­
building used, m anipulated, contested, and challenged by people in the 
border region? How did such acts shape and give meaning to border spaces?
The study shows th a t the formation of nation-states and construction of 
borders redefined the space and place of communities at the border region. 
Historically, the Sangir-Talauds were settlers of Southeastern Mindanao 
but with the colonial formation of states they were excluded from Mindanao 
and became officially part of Indonesia. The existence of the border did not 
prevent them, however, from building lives on both sides of the line. They 
crossed and re-crossed the border to make a living, find employment, and 
exploit the resources the border offers. The weak presence of the Philippine 
state in its border regions with Indonesia made the border even more 
imaginary and artificial.
Contrary to sta tist perceptions of borders as sites of control and closure, 
this study shows th a t they are also sites of interactions, exchanges, and 
accommodation. Border communities, aside from the state, are also critical 
actors in (re)defining the meaning and significance of the border.
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1C hapter I 
Introduction
This study argues th a t the formation of nation-states and construction of 
borders in Southeast Asia have led to the dislocation, exclusion, and 
suppression to varying degrees of communities straddling border regions of 
states. The territorial subdivision of communal spaces at the boundaries 
between states has also redefined and concealed the movements, affinities, 
and histories th a t m ark these spaces. Border communities, however, have 
not been passive recipients of these processes. The persistence of cross- 
border interactions and movements not only resists and challenges the 
hegemony of states over these spaces, but more so, exposes the lim itations 
of the notion of bounded collectivities. This study tests these propositions by 
examining the case of the m aritim e border region between the Philippines 
and Indonesia. From a pre-colonial center of trade and exchange, the area 
was transform ed into the ‘frontiers’ of colonial and postcolonial states. The 
impact of this transform ation is viewed, in particular, on the history of the 
Sangir-Talauds, an indigenous group now classified as part of Indonesia but 
whose history and lives navigate both sides of the border. This study will 
attem pt to address the following questions: how did the construction of the 
modern nation-state and border redefine the dynamics and locations of 
people within a border region? How were the barriers erected as result of 
nation-building used, m anipulated, contested, and challenged by people in 
the border region? How did such acts shape and give meaning to border 
spaces?
A key feature of the resurgence in boundary studies across 
disciplines beginning in the 1990s is the reappraisal of state-centered 
analytic frameworks in explaining cross-border population movements and
2the border itself (Baud & van Schendel, 1997; Newman & Paasi, 1998; 
Wilson & Donnan, 1998; Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; van Schendel & Itty, 
2005; H orstm ann & Wadley, 2006;1 Rajaram  & Grundy-Warr, 2007). 
Scholars are calling for a reorientation of border studies away from the 
state  and in its stead, privilege the perspective and narratives of borders 
and its inhabitants. This scholarly th rust, however, is nothing new. As 
early the 1960s noted political geography scholar, Ju lian  Minghi (1963), 
was already advocating studies on the people inhabiting the border regions 
as opposed to the boundary itself (Grundy-W arr & Schofield, 2005:653). It 
was only recently, however, th a t such th ru st has gained ground. The view 
from the periphery, as the literature suggests, brings into the fore a 
different account and understanding of the lived and experienced reality at 
the border.
The everyday politics of life in the border regions entail interactions 
not only with the state, institutions, and communities within the border but 
also across it. Depending on the history, socio-cultural linkages, politics, 
economics, and the porosity of the border regions, communities w ithin the 
border regions are continually engaged in a variety of negotiations and 
accommodations as they in teract with those across the border. These 
interactions have significant bearing on the understanding of borders, 
collectivities, and nation-states. The litera tu re  on borders, however, focuses 
more on “how states deal with their borderlands [andl have paid much less 
attention to how borderlands have dealt w ith their states. As a result, 
“borderlands have been represented as far more passive than  is w arranted” 
(Baud & van Schendel, 1997:235). A focus, therefore, on the people and 
their lives a t the peripheries challenges the view th a t border regions are 
the sole domain of states. Rather, it is a site of m ultiple actors and its 
meanings are not fixed but contested and changing.
This paradigm atic shift in border studies does not only deconstructs 
the view th a t borders are “unchanging, unproblematic, and unchallenged”
3(Baud and van Schendel, 1997:217) but also questions the m ainstream  
conceptualizations of borders in the social sciences th a t “are unconsciously 
bound to a spatial system characterized by more or less exclusive state 
boundaries” (Horstm ann & Wadley, 2006:3). W ithin this body of knowledge, 
border interactions are gauged within the languages of law, order, and 
analytic categories th a t presuppose social fixity. Population movements, for 
instance, become aberrations, irregular, or unauthorized ra ther than  
socially embedded processes at the edges of states. Moreover, the history of 
the m argins has largely been about the state. It is a history, according to 
Thongchai, of exclusion, suppression, and silencing of certain parts from 
becoming part of the national narrative (2003:12). Hence, a more robust 
conceptualization and understanding of the border can only occur if border 
research takes into account the narratives of other players in the 
peripheries other than  the state.
This proposition finds great resonance in Southeast Asia, where 
border regions between states continue to be sites of intense cross-border 
movements and interactions (Batistella and Asis, 2003; Wong, 2005; 
H orstm ann and Wadley, 2006). These exchanges are best exemplified by 
the traffic of labor, traders, students, tourists and pilgrims in the 
peripheries of states, which more often occur irrespective of the 
bureaucratic or legal implications of crossing the border. The dominance of 
sta te  discourse in defining these movements and interactions, both in 
practice and theory, however, has constricted the understanding of the 
nuances and complexity of border dynamics in Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
the preponderance of studies centered on the sta te  has “silenced the 
histories, cultures and a whole myriad of issues th a t underlie cross-border 
mobility” (Grundy-W arr, 2004:230). Wong lam ents th a t the unquestioning 
adoption of state agendas on the border by scholars explains much of the 
conceptual penury in border studies (2005:92).
4While arguably there is a body of litera tu re  on Southeast Asia th a t 
takes into consideration the socio-historical dynamics of border regions, 
Horstm ann and Wadley’s review of these studies shows tha t few have taken 
the border and its conceptual impact into full account (2006:5). Thongchai’s 
(1994) work on modern Thailand’s territoriality  and nationhood has been 
one of the celebrated studies on border and state formation. Yet, few have 
tru ly  followed his lead and take a critical and detailed attention on the 
ambiguity and complexity of border regions.
This study draws from these people-centered studies of the border in 
its attem pt to examine the socio-historical dynamics of a border region. 
Following Baud and van Schendel (1999), the study uses a historically- 
grounded approach in examining how the colonial and postcolonial projects 
of state formation affected the dynamics at the peripheries. To address this 
question, the study begins with an analysis of the pre-colonial organization 
of political space and this is juxtaposed with the territoriality  of the colonial 
and postcolonial nation-states. This analysis is critical since the persistence 
of pre-colonial practices in the border region informs, facilitates, and 
accounts for contemporary cross-border interactions. This is followed by an 
examination of the how communities a t the border dealt with the 
construction of state  borders within their midst. Given the lim itations of the 
study, it will restrict the analysis of the contestation, negotiation, and 
accommodation of the border to the experiences of a particular group a t the 
border.
The border region between the Philippines and Indonesia, specifically 
the area between Southeastern Mindanao and N orthern Sulawesi, is chosen 
as case study because of its historical cross-border relations, which continue 
to present. In part, the study is also prompted by the lack of studies on 
these areas. Many of the histories of communities in the area have yet to be 
studied and documented. The life-histories of the Sangir-Talauds, in 
particular, are fitting for the objectives of this study since their lives
5traverse both sides of th is border region. Prior to the formation of nation­
states, the earliest kingdoms of this community covered the present border 
region of the Philippines and Indonesia. With colonization, they were 
pushed out from the Philippines and yet they rem ain part of the country, 
albeit occupying a lim inal space in the border.
The study seeks to contribute towards a broader understanding of 
the dynamics of communities within this border region. This understanding 
is critical as local governments on both sides of the border are at the initial 
stage of developing state-led cross-border cooperation and an economic 
growth area. The voices of the border peoples are yet to be part of this 
agenda. As studies show on existing “economic growth triangles” in 
Southeast Asia, the creation of borderless economic zones do not necessarily 
lead to freer mobility of border communities or their inclusion in these new 
spaces (see for instance, Ford & Lyons, 2006).
B orders and T erritoria lities
There are a variety of term s th a t are used to denote the peripheries 
of nation-states: boundary, border, frontier, and border region. The term  
boundary, according to Baud and van Schendel (1997:213), refers to the 
precise legal line dividing sta te  territories but it may also mean in general 
term s, divisions between societies and cultures. The term  frontier, on the 
other hand, m eans the zones or regions of separation, contact, and 
transition between political units (Kristof, 1959:269). Frontier may also 
m ean the “empty spaces” a t the edges of states th a t need to be filled in, 
such as the case of 19th century American frontiers, (Anderson & O'Dowd, 
1999:603) or it could be the areas with least sta te  control prior to the 
demarcation of fixed territorial boundaries (Grundy-W arr, 1993:45). 
Anderson and O’Dowd write th a t a border is somewhere between a 
boundary and frontier (1999:603). The study follows the definition of Baud 
and van Schendel (1997:214) of border as political divides or social
6constructions as a result of nation-building. This definition is chosen to 
stress the significance of the border genesis in understanding its dynamics.
The study, however, does not focus on the political questions of 
boundary demarcation but ra ther on the impact of this process on 
communities on border regions on both sides of the line. The term  border 
region refers to areas or zones flanking and straddling international 
boundaries, including adm inistrative regions abutting a border whose 
centers are physically and socially d istan t from th a t border (Grundy-W arr, 
1993:45; Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999:595). It is similar to the terms: 
borderland, border landscapes, or borderscapes used in the disciplines of 
history and geography. Because of its proximity to the boundary, it is a t the 
border regions where the negotiations, contestations, and accommodations 
of territorial pursuits of states take place. It is presumed to encapsulate, 
according to Donnan and Wilson, “a variety of identities, social networks, 
and formal and informal, legal and illegal relationships which tie together 
people in the areas contiguous to the borderline” (1999:50). Depending on 
history, socio-cultural linkages, economic and political relations of states, a 
border region may be alienated, coexistent, interdependent, or integrated 
(Martinez, 1994).
The m eaning and functions of borders stem from the significance of 
territory and territoriality  in the organization of modern political space. 
The territory of the modern nation-state, according to Thongchai, “is not 
simply [about] a sizeable piece of the earth ’s surface, but it is a 
territoriality” (1994:16). Territoriality, according to its foremost theorist, 
Robert Sack, is “a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control actions and 
interactions of people, things, and relationships by asserting and 
attem pting to enforce control over a geographic area” (1983:55). Sack 
outlines three basic facets of territoriality  (1983:58-59). First, it uses area to 
classifies and defines things, thereby simplifying social phenomena or 
relations according to their location in space and disregarding other forms
7of scales. The territory or geographic space becomes the basis of identity or 
the object to which other attributes are assigned. Second, territoriality  also 
involves a form of communication through only one kind of m arker or sign -  
the boundary. The boundary m arks not only the boundedness of the 
territory but also makes visible territorial possession, exclusion, and 
inclusion. Third, each instance of territoriality  involves an attem pt at 
enforcing control “by proscribing or prescribing specific activities w ithin 
spatial boundaries” (Vanderegeest & Lee, 1995:388), with corresponding 
punishm ent for transgression.
It this type of territoriality  th a t underscores the modern state- 
system, which is characterized by a division of the world into fixed, 
exclusive, and bounded territorial spaces. These spaces are neatly defined 
in maps and treaties. Sovereign control over these territories is vested in 
the state. The state  is the primary actor in th is system and thus every 
aspect of the society is organized based on the state  -  national economy, 
national culture, national language, to cite a few. Interactions among states 
are mainly towards the pursuit of s ta tes’ individual interests and the 
security of their territories. As the representative and container of a society, 
the state is deemed to speak and exists on behalf of the nation. W ithin the 
nation-state system, Agnew (1994) points out th a t political identity becomes 
defined in exclusively state-territorial term s and this likewise involves 
“rigid separation between those people w ithin the territorial space pursuing 
‘universal’ values (politics) and those outside practicing different, and 
inferior values” (63). Hence, the members of a particular state are expected 
to resemble homogeneity in term s of culture, beliefs, and language.
Territoriality inevitably produces and focuses attention on the border 
(Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999:598). It is a t the border or border regions where 
territoriality is concretely manifested and expressed. More than  
demarcation of state territories, borders serves as “disruptive agents of 
territoriality” (Mishra, 2008:112). It is the point or zone where crossing
8territories entails transform ation in values and movement into a different 
social, economic, or political space (Donnan & Wilson, 1999:107). As M ishra 
notes, borders “attem pt to disrupt social (or demographic) continuities and 
achieve this by separating ‘us’ from ‘them ’—arguably the most potent form 
of the self-other binary and the most effective strategy of exclusion in the 
modern world” (2008:112-113). Borders, together with the institution of 
citizenship, designate inclusion and exclusion and define the sociopolitical 
community both in term s of “who we are” as well as “who we are not” 
(Christopher, 2005:14).
States, therefore, jealously guard their borders to ensure th a t 
whoever passes through conforms to prescribed criteria of entry and 
membership in the state. An ‘infinite adm inistrative classificatory scheme’ 
(Shamir, 2005:209) and a variety of governance technologies are employed 
to monitor, categorize, and control desirable and undesirable ‘aliens’ who 
seeks entry to the state. The visa system, for example, includes a long list of 
categories according to skills, nationality, education, civil sta tus, and 
possible contribution to the receiving state.
Furtherm ore, borders as zones of exclusion not only demarcate 
belonging and non-belonging in the territory, but likewise, disregard 
affinities and histories th a t go beyond the geographic space of the state. 
This is because, according to Anderson and O’Dowd (1999), territoriality  in 
general oversimplifies and distorts social relations: it assumes a simple and 
direct equation between the “spatial” and “social” when in fact their 
interrelationships are complex (598). This assum ption of congruence 
between the conceived space and social dynamics make territoriality  
inherently conflict-laden and problematic. These conflicts are manifested 
more often in the border regions as they are the site where contradictory 
processes and m eanings of territoriality  and border spaces collide and meet.
9While borders are m eant to be disruptive agents of social continuities 
across their space, they are also the site where the notion of bounded 
collectivities, the nation-state’s ideal of homogeneity, and centralized 
political control are disrupted and contested (Anderson & O'Dowd, 
1999:596). The imagined projection of territorial power and organization of 
states rarely coincides with the lived reality a t the border. As Vanderegeest 
and Lee (1995) describe it, the experienced territory or space at the border 
is not “abstract and homogeneous, but located, relative, and varied” (389). 
Borders as defined on maps, policies and sta te  discourse do not necessarily 
coincide with the behavior, attitudes, and practices on the ground. Nugent 
and Asiwaju argue th a t “there is generally a gap...between the intentions of 
those who police boundaries and popular perceptions and between policy 
and the flow of everyday life” (1996:1). Thus, while borders are the lim its of 
the imagined “us” and “others,” the insiders and outsiders, they are on the 
other hand, the beginning of both the real and imagined relations of border 
communities with their affinities and associations across the border. 
Furtherm ore, the m undane needs in the border necessitate border people to 
subvert, flout or ignore the existence of dem arcation between them  and 
their neighbors across the national fences. Borders then from the 
perspective of their inhabitants, as B ustam ante describes them, are “broad 
scenes of intense interactions in which people from both sides work out 
everyday accommodations based on face-to-face relationships” (as quoted in 
Baud and van Schendel, 1997:216). Hence, instead of erecting walls and 
fences, Nugent and Asiwaju point out, “the reality is frequently [border] set 
ups a zone of interaction ra ther than  representing a genuine partition” 
(1996:2).
Karin Dean (2007, 2005) fram es this gap between intention, 
perception, and reality through a tricam eral view of border spaces. Drawing 
from the works of Lefebvre and Sojay, Dean distinguishes three 
interdependent and interacting moments of space -  lived, perceived, and 
conceived. These spaces are described below:
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Conceived space is the imagined representation of space as 
found in normative forms of spatial knowledge. It is powerful; 
it dominates and codes th a t which is perceived, while 
submerging lived space. Perceived space is the mundane space 
of everyday life and of its spatial practices easily recognized 
and discussed. Although close to the real space, it is labeled 
perceived to insist th a t there is no objective reality: tha t w hat 
we consider reality is actually perceived as such. The reality is 
the world as each individual perceives and senses it. Lived 
space is produced and obscured by conceived space, and it is 
also different from the culturally norm ative perceived space. It 
is re/produced in direct contradistinctions to the homogenizing 
influences of conceived space, while being the creative source 
of the latter. W hereas conceived is convergent, lived space is 
divergent, resistant, and marginal. These three moments of 
space are interactive and interdependent, and cannot exist 
independent of one another, (emphasis in original; Dean, 
2007:186)
The territoriality  of modern nation-states encapsulates the conceived 
space; the imagined projection and organization of political space. In the 
border, the most visible is the lived space; the routine religious worship, 
m arket day across the border, commuting across the river. The conceived 
space, while clearly defined in m aps and treaties, is particularly not 
conspicuous, if not invisible a t all. At times, signposts, checkpoints, and 
flags render the conceived perceptible (or communicated following Sack’s 
concept of territoriality); otherwise, there is no way to demarcate the ends 
of states. Hence, daily practices transcend or undermine the border in 
numerous ways (Dean, 2007:186). In instances where the conceived space 
become real through state  campaigns and m ilitary presence, such as in the 
Thai-Burma border, Deans notes th a t people are able to quietly and 
creatively resist and circumvent aspects of th is space in their everyday 
lives. For example, the centuries-old five day m arket, where a m arket 
moves around from village to village cross three state  boundaries -  Chinese, 
Shan, and Kachin continues despite the imposition of the international 
boundary between China and Burma. In th is regard, Dean asks w hether it 
is the border challenging and intruding on the everyday lives of people, 
rather than  the other way around (2007:191).
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In Southeast Asia, the lived space a t the border traces its roots to the 
pre-colonial political organization of space, which is significantly different 
from the colonially-enforced territoriality  of modern nation-states. It is the 
persistence of practices associated with th is pre-colonial structure th a t 
impede the hegemony of conceived and perceived spaces. It is necessary, 
therefore, to examine pre-colonial dynamics to better understand the 
contradictions in the modern organization of space.
P olitica l Spaces o f the P ast
There are a variety of conceptual models, which seek to capture and 
explain the nature of pre-colonial political space in Southeast Asia, such as 
Wolter’s mandala  (1982), Tam biah’s galactic polity (1976), and Anderson’s 
Java’s idea of power (1990). The concept of the segmentary state has been 
widely used when referring to m aritim e states (see for instance W arren 
(1981) and Junker (2000)). While scholars argue th a t the early polities in 
the region were not identical and any attem pt a t universal categorizations 
and modeling may lead to m isunderstandings, they, nonetheless, agree th a t 
these polities m anifest sim ilar organizing principles (Baker, 2002: 172).
The pre-colonial polities in Southeast Asia were defined less by 
geographic sphere of political authority than  the interlacing of relations, 
which transcended polities, ethnicity, and families. As Kathirithamby-W ells 
sums it up, the “polity was more an area of influence than  a unit of 
territory” (1990:11). The boundary, if ever there was, was highly ambiguous 
as the decentralized political organization allowed a peripheral space to be 
a center on its own and sometimes, the nexus of m ultiple loyalties or a 
middle zone between competing polities. W ithin the m aritim e areas of 
Southeast Asia, trade was one of the essential elements linking the varied 
coastal and inland polities. The networks of m aritim e trade navigated 
across the Tagalogs, Taosugs, Bruneians, Bajaus, Bugis, M akassarese,
12
Madurese, M inangkabaus, Malays, and Javanese, as well as, with other 
aquatic worlds in Asia and beyond (Shaharil, 2001:771).
There are distinct differences of pre-colonial polity with the modern 
nation-state. First, the polity was defined and organized less on territory 
but more so by personal relationships between and among polities, between 
rulers and subjects, and between periphery and the center. This was partly 
due to the low population densities of polities and partly, on the 
organization of trade, especially among the m aritim e states (Hall, 1985:4; 
Junker, 2000:14). The polities’ prim ary concern therefore is to m aintain a 
sizeable manpower base to fuel the polity’s various needs. The mobilization 
of hum an resources was achieved through establishm ent and m aintenance 
of alliances between and among the polities, such as through 
interm arriages. Slave raiding was also common, as was, the practice of 
attracting people to the polity through open trading ports and provision of 
residence (Baker, 2002:173). Hence, it was quite common to find major 
polities as cosmopolitan centers of varying religion, ethnicity, and interests.
Second, allegiances to the polity or to the alliance were tem porary 
and fluctuating contingent on the ability of ruler or the leading polity to 
dispense and redistribute resources among allied polities and subjects. 
Moreover, “subordinate polities were always on the lookout for better 
alliances, more reliable protectors, and more profitable opportunities” 
(Amoroso & Abinales, 2005:23). Allegiances were, also, always dispersed 
across polities, a t times fleeting. The loyalty of an individual was to the 
chief where he resides or where he is in a particular period, such as in the 
case of itineran t m erchants, whose business depends on the acquiescence of 
the local chief where his ship is currently docked. On the other hand, a 
polity may be allied with other polities or under the influence of two or 
powerful polities. Thus, as Taylor notes, “people, groups, entities we might 
call polities, had multiple relationships with other people and other polities” 
(2002:6 ).
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Third, the organization of the polity was decentralized as each level 
of inter-polity alliances were structurally  and functionally equivalent at 
every level (Warren, 1981:xxii). Each polity is able to wield authority over 
his subjects, and while a t the same time may be under the influence of a 
more powerful polity. The power of the center wanes as it moves towards 
the far d istan t allied polities. Yet, because the obligations were m utual and 
there was space for continual bargaining position in the alliance (Taylor, 
2002:6), cohesion is m aintained and disintegration is averted.
Fourth, in this highly fluid space, Thongchai argues th a t borders 
rarely exist, and if they do, they do not refer to lines separating people and 
states (1994:75). He noted tha t in Siam, for example, there were many 
words th a t approximate the term  “border” but they all tend to signify areas, 
districts and frontiers at the extrem ities of kingdoms but not boundary 
lines (1994:75). This could be largely because of the flexible nature of the 
traditional Southeast Asian states, which Anderson described as:
The territorial extension of the sta te  is always in flux; it varies 
to according to the amount of Power concentrated at the center 
....the kingdoms were regarded as not having fixed and 
charted limits, but rather flexible, fluctuating perimeters. In a 
real sense, there were no political frontiers a t all, the Power of 
one ruler gradually shifting into the distance and merging 
imperceptibly with the ascending Power of a neighboring 
sovereign (as quoted in Carsten, 1998:40).
The political space of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, therefore, was not 
classified according to geographic space bu t ra ther organized around rulers, 
family linkages. There was no territorial border to speak of prim arily 
because land was not the basis of power and authority. In a sense, this 
space could be described as a ‘space of flows and networks.’ It would not be 
surprising th a t pre-colonial societies were arguably more mobile than  at 
present (Reid, 1993). This fluid and fractured space, however, would soon be 
significantly altered by colonialism, but pre-colonial spatial practices would 
not readily fade away.
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Colonial P rojects and R edefin ing Space
The division of Southeast Asia into separate territories beginning in 
the m id-seventeenth century by the colonial powers and the subsequent 
formation of nation-states reconfigured the relations between people and 
space. Perceiving existing polities to lack coherence and organization, the 
colonizers imposed a new elaborate state  system of bureaucratic 
institutions, defined and exclusive territories marked by boundaries, a 
m arket economy, and hegemonic politics (Shamsul, 2003:3). The formation 
of the border was central to the efforts of the colonizers to establish control 
over the people in their territories and to force them  to produce revenues 
(Horstmann, 2002:20). Using modern technologies such as maps, census, 
marriage regulation and naturalization, they defined who belong to their 
territories and forcibly integrated culturally diverse communities 
completely ignoring and displacing centuries of unrestricted interactions 
and communal existence. Through these processes, individual identity was 
fixed with membership in a particular territory. It did not allow for fluidity 
or flexibility, as membership in the collective demanded loyalty and 
allegiance.
The economic relations of communities were also disrupted with the 
imposition of taxes and quotas and restricted the fluid movement of goods 
and people. The geographical openness of traditional trade which allowed 
for a variety of mercantile routes were re-oriented toward the colonial 
centers such as Rangon, Saigon, Singapore, Batavia, and M anila 
(Tagliacozzo, 2005b: 150) so the colony can control commerce and properly 
levy taxes. Such a strategy enabled the colony to control and redirect the 
goods th a t passed along pre-colonial trade routes.
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In enforcing the border, the colonial rulers used the navy, the army, 
the police and the law (Tagliacozzo, 2005b: 150), whose ability to control or 
oversee the long stretches of border regions were severely challenged by 
inhabitants on both sides of the line. Tagliacozzo’s (2005a) study of the 
N etherlands E ast Indies illustrates how the Dutch skillfully used these 
instrum ents to harden their borders. The navy ensured th a t the large 
archipelago was connected and watched, while the army and later the police 
made certain th a t the colonies were taken seriously on the ground 
(Tagliacozzo, 2005b: 167). Using instrum ents of extradition, treaties, and 
most importantly, implementing a form of subject-status relationship, 
whereby local populations were made legally answerable to local state 
authorities, the Dutch were able to impose the border through legal 
concreteness as well (Tagliacozzo, 2005b: 162).
The seeming pervasiveness of the powers of the colonial state  and 
the boundary enforcement mechanisms fully in place by the s ta rt of the 
tw entieth century was not able to put a complete stop and fully control the 
traditional trade and mobility of people across state borders. Indigenous 
groups vigorously resisted the colonial policies through evasion and flight, 
smuggling, piracy, and m igration (Wadley and Ishikawa, as quoted in 
Hortsm ann, 2002:20). The border became a convenient escape route to 
avoid payment of taxes, escape punishm ent and forced conscription. As 
borders were miles away from the colonial centers, the practical 
requirem ents of daily life and economics necessitated border communities 
interacting across the border. The Kenyahs in Dutch Borneo, for instance, 
directed their trading expeditions to bazaars in British Borneo, which could 
be reached in ten  days as compared to two months of travel to reach the 
nearest trading centers of the Dutch in Borneo (Lumenta, 2005:7). Others 
simply did not mind the im aginary lines drawn on the ground and went on 
with their lives.
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The extent of mobility during the colonial period can be gleaned from 
C arsten’s (1995) documentation of m igration histories of residents in a 
village on the island of Langkawi, which lies off the coast of the Malay 
Peninsula, ju st south of the border between Malaysia and Thailand. 
Langkawi in earlier periods was part of the trading center in m ainland 
Kedah. Residents trace their origins to Penang, Perlis, Perak, Johor, 
Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan, Aceh, M inangkabau, Java, India, and Hong 
Kong. Many came in the mid-19th century to find a living. Carsten, 
however, notes th a t given the residents lim ited knowledge of earlier history 
of their ancestors, many may have come in earlier times since the island 
was part of the booming regional economy and trade in this part of pre­
colonial Southeast Asia (1995:321).
Mobility would be further prompted by the severe lack of required 
labor to fuel the colony’s expansion and development. This was despite 
earlier importation of workers from China and India, for example, in the 
case of the British colonies. The colonial governments designed an 
organized system of recruitm ent of labor from across the border but it was 
not able to deter the concomitant spontaneous flow of workers. In the late 
19th century, when the British contracted collie m igrants from Indonesia 
(mostly from Java) to work in road projects and plantations in then colonial 
Malaya, it was simultaneously accompanied by a largely spontaneous labor 
movement of M inangkabau, Batak, Bugis, Banjarese, from other islands of 
the N etherlands East Indies (Hugo, 1993:37; see also Kaur, 2005). Some of 
these contract coolie workers would eventually settle in Malaya. Hugo 
(1993) notes th a t in 1930 there were 89,735 Java-born persons living in 
Malaya and this would increase to 189,450, around by 111 percent by 1947. 
The pathways these workers trod were the same routes of future labor flows 
long after the colonizers left and continue to be up to the present (Hugo, 
1993:38). The early settlers would be significant links to la ter m igrants.
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P ostco lon ia l Space: A m bivalent State, R esolute Border R egion
The successor postcolonial states would inherit the colonially- 
designed territories, along with a continuing flow across of people, goods, 
and ideas a t the border (Tagliacozzo, 2005b: 168). While the ensuing 
postcolonial nation building projects were underscored by rhetoric of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the border regions hardly m attered in 
the priorities of the state. Wong describes the attitude of postcolonial states 
as “generally been agnostic with respect to the border and negligent with 
practices of border control” (2005:72). Amidst the ensuing nationalization of 
almost every aspect of the postcolonial states from economics, culture, 
education, and even religion (in some states), paradoxically, the border 
regions were “ignored, taken-for-granted and seen as peripheral, not ju s t in 
the literal geographic sense but in political and social term s” (Anderson, 
O'Dowd, & Wilson, 2002:3). The economic development and modernization 
programs th a t states would undertake would be largely concentrated in 
their economic and political centers. This would lead to uneven levels of 
development, particularly between the central and peripheral areas. The 
border areas stagnated and in most instances, became impoverished.
The territoriality  of postcolonial states which rests, in part, on 
enforcement and control a t the borders was weakened by its unreliable, in 
some cases, non-existent police power a t the border. Border posts were and 
rem ain poorly manned and equipped. Graft and corruption are fairly 
common in border areas. As national resources are lim ited and the state 
has other immediate concerns, the borders and its m anagem ent have been 
one of the least im portant priorities of states.
Yet, despite its indifference to the border, the postcolonial state  was 
not willing to let go of its spaces in the margins. The state  violently 
responded to separatist movements, some of which were rooted in pre­
colonial geography and association and rekindled partly by m arginalization
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in the postcolonial state. These movements were represented in the 
national discourse as th reats to the unity and peace of the nation-state. 
This explains why in contrast to the western notion of state security, in 
Southeast Asia, th reats were represented more as coming from w ithin the 
state, ra ther than  externally. The progress of the state hinged on the unity 
of the nation.
The poverty, lawlessness, porosity, underdevelopment and 
separatism  became the prim ary vignettes of borders in the minds of those 
in the centers of the state. The border was pictured as a place of purveyors 
of violence, disorder, and disunity. This was played up not only by the 
national media and governmental discourse but even in the academe. The 
border was deemed a high security risk for research. It was isolated and 
unknown. In some states, it was quite difficult to get government perm its to 
conduct fieldwork or even gain access to public information on the border 
(Wadley, 2002:3). As a result, the periphery became also m arginal in the 
production of knowledge.
The m arginalization of border was carried over in the history writing 
of the postcolonial state. The colonial projects of integration, assimilation 
and belongingness in the imagined space of the nation was reproduced in 
the postcolonial era  under the rubric of nationalism  and promoted common 
identity, unwavering loyalty, and strong civic consciousness. The national 
history was rew ritten to represent the purported ‘real’ narrative of the 
people as opposed to the colonially imposed version. Ironically, the supposed 
people’s history, writes Baker, “took the national territory as its space and 
narra ted  the rise and fall of the state  inside th a t container,” (2002:170) 
oblivious to the fact th a t the territory  is a recent creation and whose 
formation suppressed other histories, particularly those a t the m argins of 
the states. Thongchai was trenchant in describing this process of history 
writing:
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The grid of the modern mind renders the unfam iliarity of the 
indigenous polity and geography more fam iliar to us by 
translating  them into modern discourse. ... Consequently, 
these studies mislead us into considering only the point of view 
of those states which became modern nations. Whenever the 
issue is raised, we hear only the claims of the major nations. 
The fate of the tiny tribu taries under dispute rem ains virtually 
unknown. Their voices have not been heard. It is as if they 
occupied a dead space with no life, no view, no voice, and thus 
no history of their own (1994:96).
Moreover, nationalism raised national alarm  against the not-so 
unfam iliar ‘intruders’ at entry points of and w ithin the state, who once 
again become aliens and strangers. But then again, th rea ts to nationalism 
were seen to em anate less from those crossing the border into the states 
than  w ithin divisions among ethnic groups, as well as from not-so 
unfam iliar ‘foreigners’ inside the state, such as the Indians and Chinese 
(Mak, 2006; Hau, 2000). It was not until the end of the 1960s when 
Communism became a th rea t to the security of democratic states tha t 
border crossings were seriously looked upon. After the th rea t died down, 
however, the states returned to their centers and once more left the borders 
on their own. In the case of M alaysia, the flow of Indonesians beginning in 
the 1960s was not classified as a th rea t until the early 1980s, when 
prompted by the influx of refugees from Vietnam, the state started  to 
develop foreign labor policies.
The indifference of states towards their borders and precarious hold 
on them, not to mention their lack of the capacity to provide the 
infrastructure to guard their highly permeable terrestria l and m aritime 
boundaries account for the continuation of pre-colonial ties and network 
and the unabated flow of border crossings. Border communities looked 
towards the centers of states nearest to their areas for livelihood and better 
opportunities. In the case of the people of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, it was 
Sabah, one of the centers of development of the federated Malaysia. Sabah 
would also be the destination of m any Indonesians from Sulawesi and
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Kalim antan. The border highlighted, in a sense, not only the political 
boundaries but also the differences in levels of development and access to 
opportunity.
Massive cross-border labor flows would be triggered by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s by the need for cheap workers as states like Malaysia and 
Thailand embarked on an aggressive industrialization programs. As part of 
its New Economic Policy (NEP), M alaysia required much manpower to 
carry out its ambitious infrastructure projects and land development 
schemes (Nayagam, 1992:483; N arayanan and Lai, 2005:33). Like its 
British predecessors, the M alaysian state  sourced its much need labor from 
the neighboring states of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Labor 
flows would be further induced as Indonesia and the Philippines lagged 
behind the economic progress achieved by Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand. All the while, labor recruitm ent occurred without proper 
documentation and tacit imm igration policies. The practice of hiring ‘illegal’ 
workers w ithout government restra in t was to persist until the early 1980s 
when M alaysia began implementing foreign labour laws (Wong & Anwar, 
2003).
Labor flows would be accompanied by movements of goods across the 
border, partly  because the border economy is loosely integrated with the 
center and partly due to geographical reasons. It is often cheaper to source 
goods from across the border than  from the d istan t regional or state 
centers. In Tawi-Tawi, for instance, it is quite ordinary to find goods 
produced in M alaysia than  from the Philippines as travel to islands north of 
Sabah would only take a few hours. The border also provides a m arket 
opportunity for locally banned goods readily available on the other side, 
such as guns and narcotics. All of which would take place without regard 
for the presence of the boundary and the accompanying legal implications 
(Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000).
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In these instances of border crossings, the social networks th a t long 
existed would be revitalized, reinforced, and reshaped according to the 
needs of the time. Colonial projects failed to cut these linkages; they merely 
became “transboundary.” In the postcolonial period, networks were 
reorganized to conform to new realities w ithin the state boundaries. For 
example, the traditional m arket in borders of Kachin, China, and Burma 
mentioned earlier was sustained among others, by long-held practice of 
interm arriages within this area. According to Dean, with the economic 
development in Chinese area of the border beginning in the mid-1980s, 
more Kachin women from Burm a are m arrying Kachin men in China, 
which was the reverse prior to the 1980s with more Kachin girls from China 
getting hooked with Kachin men in Burma (2005:817). Nonetheless, 
interm arriage continues to serve as highly meaningful integrative element 
among the territorially divided communities of Kachins.
On the other hand, W alker’s (1999) study on the long distance 
traders in the borderlands of Laos, Thailand, China and Burm a shows that 
the border communities were not only active in creating and m aintain 
transborder transactions, but also in reworking state  regulatory practices 
at the border. He argues th a t contrary to notions of powerless peripheries, 
the border communities were in fact, critical actors in defining the 
regulation and organization of trade within these areas. The communities 
were interacting both with the m arket and state.
Social networks would also be a significant factor in linking, 
facilitating, and sustaining population flows. Studies on cross-border 
mobility in Southeast Asia show th a t family networks are essential in 
linking prospective destinations and providing the much needed resource in 
settlem ent and integration across the border (Hugo, 1997; Batistella & Asis, 
2003). The availability of these resources over time has shaped strategies of 
m igrants in overcoming stringent immigration policies, particularly for 
illegal m igrants. Kasim's studies show th a t most Indonesians would depend
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on relatives, friends or ethnic groups, as well as on taikongs 
(recruiters/brokers) for tem porary accommodation, job information, trading 
licenses and protection from M alaysian authorities (2000:112).
The response of nation-states in Southeast Asia since 1980 to cross- 
border flows is reminiscent of colonial governments’ policies. Both are 
premised on the controllability of borders. Castles notes th a t Asian leaders 
are hesitan t in recognizing the realities of porous boundaries (1998:13); 
instead, immigration policies are aimed at hardening borders. The 
lim itations and effectiveness of these immigration policies are best 
represented by the failed efforts of Thailand and M alaysia to control cross- 
border flows by erecting walls in their adjoining border regions beginning in 
the 1970s (Castles, 1998:12). The walls were a mix of concrete, barbed wire, 
steel and iron fencing. They were not able to deter, however, cross-border 
flows of goods and people. Communities on both sides of the border found 
ways to overcome the walls and immigration policies such as the use of 
m ultiple citizenships, fake identity cards, and cross-border m arriages 
(Horstmann, 2002:21; Scalabrini M igration Center, 2000:15). By 1990s, 
when M alaysia and Thailand began to tighten their imm igration policies, 
Horstm ann noted th a t “Muslim people in Southern Thailand [made] use of 
kinship relations and religious networks to get citizenship rights in 
M alaysia (2002:21). The plan to build a more solid 2.5-meter- high-concrete 
wall was eventually scrapped in 2001.
Immigration policies also founder on the continuing demand by local 
economies for cheap labour th a t flows across borders. In the Malaysian 
case, for example, labor shortages have persisted despite the presence of 
foreign labor even during economic crises. From 1980 to 1988, for instance, 
surveys from the Rubber Research Institu te  of M alaysia and the United 
Planters Association of Malaysia reveal a shortage of four to six percent 
(Nayagam, 1992:482; Pillai, 1992:42). At the height of 1997 crisis, the 
agriculture and m anufacturing sectors reported 60,000 to 70,000 vacancies
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(Kassim, 1999:174). The labor shortages are in part caused by refusal of 
M alaysians to take up jobs in the construction, m anufacturing, and 
plantations because of lack of job security, low wages, and the m anual work 
involved (Nayagam, 1992:483; Pillai, 1992:24-26).2 In such instances, the 
M alaysian state  has always been a reluctant actor. The country’s policies on 
labor flow, including illegal flows, have been described as ad-hoc, stop-go, 
inconsistent, and reactive (Kanapathy, 2001:430; N arayanan & Lai, 
2005:34; Piper, 2006:361). In 2002, for instance, the M alaysian government 
deported around 400,000 illegal workers as part of a nationwide campaign 
to curb illegal migration. The impact on the construction industry (and to 
some extent, in plantation areas) was immediately felt, with a daily loss of 
RM5 million because of labour shortages (Batistella and Asis, 2003:19). The 
government eventually relented to the demands of the industry and allowed 
the re-entry of Indonesian workers (Batistella and Asis, 2003:19).
Another significant part of government efforts to curb illegal flow 
across the border is to frame such movements w ithin the discourse of 
security and threats. As transgressors of the border and violators of 
migration regimes, border crossers are categorized under non-traditional 
security concerns as against, for example, the traditional m ilitary threats 
posed by neighboring states (Dupont, 2002:9; Tigno, 2004:158; Mak, 2006). 
In the post 9-11 global w ar on terrorism , flows at the border have been 
further subjected to suspicion as mobility has been conflated with extremist 
movements a t the borders. The paradigm  extends to public representation 
of m igrants as harbingers of social instability, crim inality and disease. This 
is evident in Grundy-W arr’s (2004) observation on the Thai-M yanmar 
border:
...the border region, particulary the Burmese side, is viewed 
by many ordinary Thai people as andharai (dangerous) and in 
popular imagination it is the home of unruly drug barons, 
warlords, ethnic rebels...[and] by extension, refugees and 
undocumented m igrants may be viewed as transm itters of
anarchy, chaos, crime and disorder into the domain of 
Thailand (251-252).
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Shimizu (2001:4) had a sim ilar observation on the association of 
Filipinos in Sabah with crimes as reflected in newspaper headlines during 
his short visit to the area in 1999:
In the three months between March and May, 1999, the Daily 
Express, for example, [carried] headlines more than  20 times 
of arrested Filipinos, such as “High quality IC: Filipino jailed 
(3/18),” “Bringing in Syabu: Filipino duo jailed (3/24),” “Theft, 
shoplifting: Filipino, local jailed (4/13),” “Filipino jailed for 
stealing (4/15),” “Shabu and ganja: Filipino jailed (5/2)” 
“Fishbomb murder: Filipino charged (5/25).”
This observation is confirmed by a more expanded analysis of news 
coverage on m igrants in English-language M alaysian newspapers, 
including the government-sanctioned New S trait Times, which shows 
continuing association of m igrants with social problems, including drugs, 
m urder, rape, disease and prostitution (Ford, 2006:235). Crimes committed 
by m igrants in Malaysia, however, rem ain limited. Based on police 
statistics provided by M alaysia’s Police Inspector-General, Musa Hassan, to 
a non-government organization, only two percent of the crimes committed 
in the country are by foreign workers (SUARAM, 2007:16-17). This is also 
the case in earlier periods.3
The paradigm of suspicion has been a powerful m etaphor in the 
construction of the supposed siege and uncontrollability of border flows. 
This has enabled states to play up the security risks posed by m igrants to 
further justify the need “to reinforce the sanctity of national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity... protect national space and [its] citizens as the 
constitutive element in the territory” (Grundy-Warr, 2004:252). The border 
regions rem ain, however, stubborn to any form of control by the state. 
Mobility continues to flourish and flow.
26
C onclusion
Borders and their study cannot be reduced to the conceived notions of 
the modern nation-state -  closed, controlled, and stable. Beneath the neat 
cartographies of boundaries between states are histories, experiences, and 
geographies th a t continue to resist and reclaim their place in these spaces. 
In Southeast Asia, these histories trace the roots of current trans-border 
flows to the pre-colonial relations between communities and polities. 
Mobility was an essential aspect of these relations. The colonial projects 
may have carved out Southeast Asia into distinct territories and redefined 
the repertoire of communal relations but they failed nonetheless, to break 
up the links and mobile practices between communities. The indifference of 
postcolonial states to their peripheries and feeble attem pts to control flows 
did little to stem the persistence of flows.
This will be the context from which this study will look at the case of 
the Sangir-Talauds as they navigate through the history of the border 
between the Philippines and Indonesia. The second chapter examines the 
pre-colonial political, economic and cultural spaces of this border region by 
framing it within the m aritim e world of the Sulu-Sulawesi region. It also 
explores the early history of Sangir-Talauds in the area. The chapter ends 
with the intrusion of the Spanish into Mindanao and the political 
reconfiguration of the area. The th ird  chapter begins with the colonization 
of Mindanao by the Americans and brief discussion on their associated 
settlem ent programs there. This era also witnessed the Sangir-Talauds 20th 
century movement into Mindanao. The chapter examines the factors behind 
their mobility, their life histories and issues faced as they settled in 
Mindanao. The fourth chapter briefly examines how the Sangir-Talauds’ 
migration in the area were perceived by the Philippine sta te  and local host 
communities. It also takes a short foray into the policies implemented by 
the state. The fifth chapter sum m arizes the findings of the study and 
presents the conclusion.
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C hapter II
From  Zone o f C ontact to Zone o f D ivision: 
The M aritim e World o f Sulu-Sulaw esi Sea
This chapter examines the contexts, patterns, and dynamics of relations in 
the border regions of the Philippines and Indonesia in the pre-colonial and 
colonial periods. Fundam ental to understanding th is border region is to 
in terpret its dynamics from the broader political, economic and socio­
cultural processes within the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, particularly during the 
pre-colonial period. The m aritim e polities within this area were largely 
linked by trade and familial relations and their political organization was 
characteristic of other m aritim e polities in Southeast Asia. The subject 
border region of this study was a communal space not only for polities 
w ithin the area but also for travelers and m erchants coming from other 
parts of the Asian region and beyond. To use the m etaphor of the sea, the 
interactions and exchanges were boundless. The notion of the sea as a 
natural boundary was alien to the settlers of the various islands in this 
area. The Sangir-Talauds were one of the many groups who tam ed and 
traversed this vast body of water. The first section covers th is period of 
borderless political space, as well as, the history of the Sangir-Talauds. The 
second section the transform ation of the area into a border region and its 
subsequent adm inistrative reorganization to conform to the exigencies of 
modern state  governance. From a center of contacts and exchange, the sea 
became a divide and frontier. Trade and the loyalties of peoples were 
directed towards the centers of the colonies away from their kin and 
economic partners across the sea. Yet, as people’s lives and cultures follow 
the rhythm  of the sea, the ancient maritim e highways became routes of 
“subterfuge” and “evasion” as people defied the invisible lines of 
demarcation for trade and other purposes.
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G eographical Background
The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, in geological and oceanographical terms, 
covers approximately 900,000 km 2 and includes the two largest seas in the 
area, Sulu and Sulawesi, and several other sm aller seas -  the Sibuyan, 
Visayan and Camotes Seas in the northeast and the Bohol Sea further 
south (DeVantier, Alcala, & Wilkinson, 2004). It is bounded on the 
southwestern section by the northeastern  portion of Borneo (comprised of 
Indonesian E ast Kalim antan and M alaysian Sabah), while the Palawan 
and Visayas islands define its border in the north. The peninsula of North 
Sulawesi, including the Sangir-Talaud archipelago, forms the south and 
southeastern borders and northern and eastern Mindanao define the 
eastern section. The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea is divided among three states: 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.4
The focus of this study is on the southeastern side of the Sulu- 
Sulawesi Sea, in particular, Southeastern Mindanao and North Sulawesi, 
the modern maritim e border regions of Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
Balut and Sarangani islands5 are the southernm ost islands of Mindanao on 
the Philippine side of the border. Across the border is the Sangir-Talaud6 
group of islands, composed of 112 islands, 30 of which are inhabited, and 
referred to in Indonesia as Nusa Utara or northern archipelago and 
officially part of North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Balut Island is about 35 
nautical miles from Marore, one of the northernm ost islands in the Sangir- 
Talaud archipelago. Travel time by motorized boat between the two islands 
takes about two to four hours depending on sea conditions. From Manado, 
the political and economic capital of North Sulawesi, Marore is around 280 
miles and sea travel takes about ten to twelve hours.
Although, the study refers to the Sulu and Ternate Sultanates, it 
principally discusses pre-colonial Magindanao Sultanate whose history is 
intricately linked with the histories of the communities and islands in
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Southeastern Mindanao and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. The area where the 
Sultanate of Magindanao was located in pre-colonial Sulu-Sulawesi world is 
now part of Cotabato City. It should be not be confused with the 
M agindanao ethnic group and the present Province of Magindanao.
L im itations o f Sources
Despite the richness of history of the focus area of this study, the 
litera ture  rem ains sparse. There has been no archaeological work 
conducted, for instance, on Magindanao (Junker, 2000:102). The VOC 
records on this area have not been fully exhausted, such th a t it was one of 
the priority research areas identified by the N etherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research under the TANAP program.7 This is contrast to the 
southwestern section covering the Sulu and Sabah islands where extensive 
studies have been done. In the case of the Sangir-Talaud archipelago, it 
rem ains an unexplored “frontier” for historical research (Lapian, 2003:6). 
K aunang (2001) points out th a t even the official Sejarah Nasional (National 
History) of Indonesia only has two references on the archipelago. The first 
one refers to the islands as being home to some of the finest sea navigators 
in the area and second, as a dependency of the Ternate Sultanate. Ricklefs 
(2001) well-known work, A History o f Indonesia , also does not have 
references concerning the archipelago.
On the Philippine side, there have been studies done on the 
Magindanao Sultanates but not much on other histories of smaller 
kingdoms during the pre-colonial period, particularly on the southeastern 
section of Mindanao. Laarhoven’s (1989) detailed exam ination of Dutch 
sources is an excellent m aterial since it provides a different picture of 
Magindanao in 17th century. Her work balances the mainly Spanish 
m aterials used in the classic works of Ileto (1971), Majul (1973), and 
Saleeby (1976). Much less have been done on the flow of goods and people in
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the area. The study mines these available sources to establish the historical 
context and patterns of mobility in the area.
Given the limited documentary sources, the study tu rns to histories 
from the ground by examining the oral literature and family histories or 
tarsila / silsila8 of communities in the research area. More than  family trees, 
these narratives provide significant insights into the extent of networks and 
alliances of the early polities. Elsewhere, noted historians such as Barbaya 
Andaya (1993), Tony Day (1996), and H eather Sutherland (1973) have 
extensively used family histories to examine early polities in Indonesia and 
Southeast Asia. These narratives, however, are not w ithout lim itations.
First, Majul (1973:1-6) points out th a t tarsilas/silsilas were primarily 
w ritten as genealogical accounts, either lineal or m ultilineal. Thus, they do 
not carry specific details on the particulars of the time they were written. 
There is also problem with chronology as dates are not commonly included 
in the genealogies. Second, some of these narratives are imbued with 
mythical tales incorporating real or imagined elements. Third, the transfer 
of the story from one generation to the next until the time it was put into 
writing also contributed to confusions in names, places, and relations.
Despite its lim itations, however, the value of these genealogies needs 
to be appreciated on the role of family linkages in the politics and economics 
of the time. Interm arriages were an essential part of creating and 
m aintaining alliances among the polities. It was imperative, therefore, that 
ruling elites know the extent of their familial linkages. The family prestige 
is also partly hinged on the power and influence of their ancestors or 
familial relations. Moreover, the legitimacy to rule is also gained by tracing 
lineage to key political or religious figures, such as Prophet Mohamad, or 
great kingdoms in neighboring areas (Majul, 1973:6). By tracing lineage to 
a common heroic or mythical individual, it was also possible for peoples of 
these communities to “perceive far-flung and unfam iliar places as linked to
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their own societies through enduring familial ties” (Andaya B., 1993:39) 
and thus, further strengthening intergroup relations. Local Mindanao 
historian, Macario Tiu, points out th a t notw ithstanding the legendarization 
process, scholars should “listen closely and search for the kernels of 
historian tru ths and other clues in these so-called naive stories” (2005:xiv).
There are two sets of genealogies related to M agindanao and 
Southeastern Mindanao. The first one is composed of royal genealogies of 
M agindanao collected by Saleeby (1976), which have been the subject of 
scholarly study in the past decades. Saleeby got hold of these genealogies 
while working with Muslim datus, sultans and the learned men (ulama) in 
the 1900s. The second set is a recent collection of genealogies from various 
communities from Sangir-Talaud Islands, Sarangani Bay and Davao Gulf 
region by three scholars from Mindanao, North Sulawesi, and Japan 
(Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999).9 Compared to Saleeby’s collections which 
were originally w ritten in Arabic, Malay, and local languages, the second 
set were mainly w ritten in Bahasa Indonesia, Sangil and other local 
Mindanao languages, and some were based on oral recollections. 
Unfortunately, however, Hayase and his group did not provide sufficient 
information on the persons who provided the tarsila, particularly on the 
collections from Sangir-Talaud Islands. There was also no mention if and 
how the tars ilas’ authenticity was verified. This collection, however, is 
highly significant since it covers the kingdoms or chiefdoms on the 
peripheries of the powerful Magindanao, Sulu, and Ternate sultanates and 
which other historical sources are lacking in detail. It also provides 
information where family members moved using present-day names of 
these areas, unlike the Sulu and Magindanao genealogies where such 
information is quite limited. Moreover, the tarsilas in the second collection 
contain references to the current generation. The problems raised by Majul 
(1973) in the Magindanao genealogy are also true  in the second set of 
genealogies. There is a serious problem with chronology and dates; 
confusion with names, relatives, and places; and the fusion of two or more
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different events. Ulaen notes th a t even the m aterials collected from the 
local government of Sangir-Talaud are riddled with problems of chronology 
(2003:59-61). As the second set apparently has been updated, some modern 
names of places do not correspond to specific historical context.10
The P o litica l Space o f th e  Su lu-Sulaw esi Sea
Like other m aritim e regions in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the 
political milieu of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea was characterized by fluid, 
segmented, decentralized, and yet, interconnected kingdoms of varying 
sizes and complexity. The kingdoms were not defined according to 
geographic space but ra ther through personal relations between rulers and 
subjects. Political power was dispersed and decentralized and in ter­
kingdom relations were determined through alliances and reciprocity. 
Overlapping allegiances were quite common as kingdoms and rulers looked 
for the best opportunities for their subjects. Interm arriages were also 
fam iliar occurrences as polities sought to establish and strengthen their 
alliances, making it occasionally difficult to trace kinship because of 
interlacing filial relations. Trade has always been pinpointed as the main 
factor in hastening interconnectedness, as well as fostering a political 
structure with fluid boundaries and membership (Junker, 2000; 
Kathirithamby-W ells, 1990; Hall, 1985). Cultural and personal linkages, 
however, are as significant as these trade imperatives in nurturing  the 
intricate networks between kingdoms, peoples, and rulers in the area. In 
understanding a particular polity or kingdom in this political space, 
therefore, it is essential to examine it from its relations and dynamics with 
others ra ther in isolation or w ithin its particular territorial space.
The Sangir-Talaud kingdoms were one of the many kingdoms in this 
m aritim e region. Based on early Dutch sources, “there were originally two 
kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago but by seventeenth century, 
they split into nine separate units, together with kingdoms of Siau and
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Ta(g)hulandang to the south, made up a total of eleven kinglets...in  the 
nineteenth century, there were still six kingdoms in the area -  Tabukan, 
M anganitu, Kandahar, Tahuna, Tahulandang and Siau -  all belonging to 
the same ethnic group” (Lapian, 2003:6). The kingdoms were politically 
fragm ented (Lapian, 2003:6; Henley, 1993), brought about in part by the 
sparsity of population, topography of the archipelago and competition. They 
were extensively linked through interm arriages but never developed into a 
single polity (Henley, 1993). The people of these kingdoms were known for 
their advanced m aritim e culture as demonstrated, for example, in their 
excellent seafaring and boatbuilding skills and well-developed m aritime 
vocabulary (Henley, 2005:90, Lapian, 2003:6; Lapian, 2008).11 Dutch 
accounts show th a t the Sangirs traveled in groups of up to one thousand, 
spending months at a time away from home on expeditions to as far away 
as Manila. This led to settlem ents in Southern Mindanao, Northern 
Sulawesi, and North Maluku (Lapian, 2003:6; Henley, 2005:80-81). It is not 
known, however, when the kingdoms of Tahuna and K andahar established 
settlem ents in Sarangani Island and areas in the Davao Gulf. W hat is 
widely recorded is their involvement in the long distance trade tha t 
flourished in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea at the beginning of the eleventh 
century.
Trade and Political Space
Inter-island contact and trade in the Sulu-Sulawesi have been 
posited to have been frequent as early as the first millennium C.E., 
predating the entry of Indian, Chinese, and Islamic peoples (Bellwood, 
1999:129-136). This indicates th a t even before the beginning of w ritten 
histories, people have been on the move and been in contact with other 
groups. The traditional trading system was characterized by a reciprocal 
system of exchange of goods between coastal and upland settlem ents, with 
the former bringing in salt and other m arine produce to barter with rice 
and forest products not readily available in the lowland. The development
34
of a more elaborate form of trade, however, started  at the beginning of 
eleventh century when the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea became a major route of 
traders, particularly the Chinese, seeking the products of the Spice Islands 
in the Moluccas and who along the way traded with settlem ents dotting the 
coasts (Hall, 1985:24).
W ith the entry of the Chinese, luxury goods (such as porcelain, silk, 
beads) were introduced as a medium of exchange for mainly interior forest 
produce such as resins, honey, wax, spices and hardwood (Junker, 2000:22). 
The sources of these goods in demand were upland and interior settlem ents 
and generally were not under the control of coastal kingdoms. The use of 
force and coercion was not an option for eliciting cooperation because of the 
rugged topography and fierce resistance from upland settlers (Junker, 
2000:22). Coastal states, therefore, promoted alliances, ritual exchange of 
prestige goods, and interm arriages to integrate the economies of the upper 
and lower settlem ents. Katirithamby-W ells (1990) points out th a t “the 
acquisition by local chiefs of prestige and luxury goods from trade and 
redistribution of some of these amongst lallied chiefs] provided the basis for 
the exercise of economic influence and political authority in [maritime] 
Southeast Asia” (2).
In the case of the Sangir-Talaud Islands, a sim ilar system of 
relations which Henley (2005) refers to as “privileged exchange,” wherein 
people within the kingdom were only allowed to trade with the datu, who in 
tu rn  was only one who had the privilege of dealing w ith foreign traders. The 
Sangir datus, for instance, had vassals in Talaud which were prohibited 
from sailing to any destination other than  Sangir and enforced apparently 
“on pain of death” (Henley, 2005:76). Imported goods prim arily served as a 
medium exchange between Sangir and its vassals in the archipelago. 
However, as Henley pointed out, the Talauds were known to have direct 
contact with Mindanao (2005:76). Beyond local politics, the kingdoms are 
all tributaries to the more powerful sultanate of Ternate. The kingdoms
35
known trade goods were coconut oil, brass wire, iron weapons and maritim e 
produce.
As trade and commerce prospered, some coastal states transform ed 
from exchange points to redistribution centers and later on, as port-polities 
of long-distance or regional trade. By the beginning of 14th century, Sulu 
and Magindanao were already known in Chinese accounts as having well- 
developed internal networks for collecting large quantities of exportable 
forest and m aritim e products (Junker, 2000:191). Throughout the fifteenth 
century, the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea would be witness to the traffic of vessels 
“sometimes m anned with several dozen fighting men, traders and slaves, 
sailing from the Sulu Islands and the Mindanao coast to the Sangihe 
Islands and then to the Moluccas and back” (Ptak, 1992:38). By this time, a 
num ber of islands would be known not only for their seafaring skills but 
also in boat making, such Sulu and the Sangir-Talaud group (Ptak, 
1992:38). Ternate would emerge as the most powerful clove-exporting port 
a t the end of this Chinese trade route. Its influence covered the kingdoms 
and settlem ents throughout eastern  Indonesia, including North Sulawesi 
and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. At the time the Iberian colonizers came in 
16th century, there was already a steady stream  of trade and traders in 
connecting the various islands from Sulu to the Moluccas. It is thus, not 
surprising to find local seafarers, with their wide knowledge of the area, in 
Iberian ships acting as guides in the early explorations of people, like 
Pigafetta, of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea (Lapian, 2008:6-8).
Of the three major trading centers to emerge in the Sulu-Sulawesi 
Sea, M agindanao’s history was intricately linked w ith the histories of the 
communities and islands in Southeastern Mindanao and Sangir-Talaud 
Islands.12 The Magindanao Sultanate early in its history was divided 
between two major kingdoms, which were connected by the Pulangi River 
or Rio Grande. The upper reaches of the river is where the agriculturally- 
rich Buayan kingdom was located, while the coastal state  of Magindanao
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was located along the lower end of the river. The Buayan has other exits to 
the sea but the Pulangi River was the most accessible. M agindanao’s 
frequent contacts w ith foreign traders, particularly the Chinese, perhaps 
explain why in most studies the two kingdoms are singly referred to as 
Magindanao and in earlier maps, Mindanao is used to refer to Magindanao. 
Ileto (1971) argues th a t is erroneous since Buayan was as powerful as its 
coastal rival. The relation between the two kingdoms was beset with 
in term itten t conflicts but marked, as well, with interm arriages in almost 
every generation. U nder the reign of Sultan Q udarat the two rival 
kingdoms would be finally unified under the Sultanate of Magindanao.
The rise of M agindanao as a major international trading port in the 
Sulu-Sulawesi Sea began after Ternate was put under Dutch protection in 
1607 which disrupted the traditional system of trade and agricultural 
production in the Moluccas (Ileto, 1971:4; Laarhoven, 1990:166). Through 
selective production of exportable goods and monopoly over production and 
distribution of more valuable goods such as cloves and nutmegs, the Dutch 
effectively monopolized trade  (Ileto, 1971:4). Local and foreign traders, such 
as the Chinese, Arabs, and Malays, sought alternative ports and 
Magindanao presented itself as a free port, which made it the most 
attractive option. Q udarat’s skillful m anipulation of its relations with the 
Spanish, Dutch and even the English allowed the Sultanate m aintain its 
neutrality  and independence and proved highly beneficial as it attracted 
more trade and traders. The Sultanate became home to a variety of traders 
and slaves, such as the Chinese, Malays, Burmese, M akassarese, Bugis, 
Ternatans, Amboinese, and even those from the Indian coasts (Laarhoven, 
1986:37-14). The Spanish re trea t in 166313 and absence from Mindanao for 
almost 50 years allowed M agindanao to freely expand its trade to as far as 
Batavia, Malacca, Siam, Ternate, Amboina, Madras, and M anila with goods 
ranging from wax to rice, tobacco, and cinnamon (Abinales, 2000a:47; Ileto, 
1971:6, Laarhoven, 1989:213-221).
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Magindanao’s primary trading and alliance partner was the 
Sultanate of Ternate even prior to the entry of European colonizers. The 
relation was not limited to trade but also encompassed political and 
religious interests. Ternate joined Magindanao as well in resisting Spanish 
control in the 16th century. In one instance, Ternate sent “a fleet of many 
caracoas or rowing-barges and other vessels commanded by cachils with 
selected soldiers num bering over one thousand warriors and a num ber of 
light artillery to compel the Spaniards to break their camp [near the mouth 
of the Pulangi] and go away” (Morga, as quoted in Ileto, 1971:3). Ternate, 
M agindanao and Buayan also conducted joint raids in Christian 
settlem ents in the Visayas and Southern Luzon (Majul, 1973:117). 
Laarhoven notes th a t the alliance with Ternate “enabled the Magindanaos 
to stay around and reside in Ternate, to visit relatives, to renew old 
acquaintances, and even to fight in ambushes” (1989:40). More than 
strengthening political relations, the alliance also reinforced the Islamic 
ties of Magindanao and Ternate. At the end of the 16th century, Ternate is 
said to have sent Islamic teachers to Magindanao to establish Islamic 
schools and teach children to write and read the Koran (1989:38). The 
intensity of this relation, according to Majul, created an erroneous 
impression among early 17th century Dutch w riters who assumed that 
M agindanao was under T ernate’s political control (1973:115).
The kingdoms in the Sarangani-Balut Islands and Sangir-Talaud 
archipelago were at the crossroads of the trade routes from China to 
Moluccas and from M agindanao to Ternate and vice-versa. Though no 
major sultanate  or trading port would emerge in the area, the islands were 
frequently visited by seafarers, including European voyagers. Sangir 
Island, for instance, was known as a resting and tran sit point to and from 
Moluccas, with a good stock of food supply for seafarers. It is also because of 
th is geographical position th a t these kingdoms found themselves at the 
crossroads of the influence and control of the powerful Sultanates of 
M agindanao and Ternate, as well as, the competing European powers. The
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ensuing relations between the kingdoms of Sangir-Talaud Islands and the 
Sultanates were characterized by fluidity and overlapping allegiances.
Map 2. The Sangir-Talaud archipelago, circa 1890s. Source: Hickson, John 
(1899). A naturalist in north Celebes: a narrative of travels in Minahassa, 
the Sangir and Talaut Islands, with notices of the fauna, flora and 
ethnology of the districts visited. London.
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The kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago were primarily 
tributaries of the Sultanate of Ternate. In 1575, K andahar and Ternate, for 
instance, signed a pact to strengthen political and economic alliances 
(Laarhoven, 1989:16). From the beginning, however, the relations of the 
Sangir-Talaud kingdoms with Ternate have been precarious and their 
strategic position between centers of power made them  even less dependent 
on Ternate (Andaya L., 1993:84-85). It was also a relation beset with 
violence and coercion as Ternate used force to impose its influence and 
control over the archipelago (Henley, 1993). It is partly because of this tha t 
the Sangir-Talauds were thus known to switch allegiance to escape the 
control of Ternate. When the Spaniards came to the area, a num ber of local 
chiefs in Sangir placed themselves under the vassalage of Spain (Henley, 
1993:39-41). After Spain withdrew from the Moluccas, many took the Dutch 
as their patron. Moreover, the strategic location of archipelago in the trade 
routes from China to Moluccas made local chiefs less dependent on Ternate 
for imported goods th a t were needed to acquire local products. As a result, 
“Ternaten dominance [in the archipelago] had never been more than  patchy 
and in term itten t” (Henley, 1993:39-40). By 17th century, while the 
kingdoms in the archipelago signed treaties with the Dutch as their new 
patron, they were also quite active in m aintaining trade relations with 
Magindanao.
The history of relations w ith Magindanao follows footsteps to a very 
d istan t past. The kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago trace their 
beginnings to a prince who hails from Magindanao. His story of moving to 
Sangir and returning to Mindanao before his death will be replicated in the 
patterns of chiefs in Sangir being born in Mindanao, ruling in Sangir, and 
retiring in Mindanao. This should not a come as a surprise since from the 
perspective of this period, southeastern Mindanao was also home to the 
Sangir-Talauds and it was part of their kingdoms. As reflected in the 
genealogies, they had a num ber of settlem ents in the areas surrounding 
Davao Gulf areas and Sarangani Bay. It is because of their presence in
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Sarangani Bay tha t they would have close family and political contacts with 
the Buayan kingdom in the upper valley of Magindanao.
Familial and Mythological Affinities
The origin myth of Sangir kingdoms recounts th a t Gumansalangi, 
son of a Cotabato14 sultan named Laesangalung, founded the kingdom of 
Tampung-Lawo or Sangihe Geguwa between 1300 and 1400 A.D. (Juda, 
1995:105-110; Hayase, Non & Ulaen, 1999).15 The story goes th a t he was 
banished to the forest for being a bad son. While in the forest, the king of 
Heaven sent her daughter, Princess Konda, disguised first, as a sickly and 
stinking woman and next, as a woman with psoriasis, to test the character 
of the prince. In both instances, the prince welcomed and helped the 
princess in disguise. Upon seeing his good behavior, the king of Heaven 
offered her daughter to the prince for m arriage, which the la tte r gladly 
accepted. They were told, however, by the king to leave Cotabato and find a 
place th a t will be indicated by signs of rains, lightning, and thunder. The 
couple left Cotabato, headed east and reached the island of M arulung 
(Balut), from there moved to Taghulandang, Ruang, Siau, and Karangetang 
but did not find the signs. It was in the m ountain of Sahendarum ang in the 
island of Sangihe or Tampung Lawo th a t they were welcomed with rain, 
lightning and thunder. It is here where they established the first kingdom 
of Sangihe. The residents gave Gumansalangi the name Vizier Medelu 
(which means jinn of thunder) and his wife, Princess Mekila (or princess of 
lightning) (Juda, 1995:109). In his old age, M angunsalangi would return  to 
and spend his last days in Mindanao. His youngest son, Meliku-Nusa went 
to Bolaang Mongondow and m arried a local princess. The eldest, Melintang- 
Nusa followed him to Cotabato and m arry the daughter of the king of Tugis 
(South Cotabato). He would later go back to Sangir and became its second 
king and would rule in the area of Tabukan. In his old age, he too would go 
back to Mindanao. His descendants would later establish the various 
kingdoms in the Sangihe-Talaud group of islands.
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In appreciating the significance of the hero, Gumansalangi, Barbara 
Andaya suggests th a t instead of interpreting him as a specific individual, it 
is best to look at him as a “representative of something larger -  chiefdoms, 
ethnic groups, whole societies -  and as vehicles for conveying meaningful 
messages about relevant relationships” (1993:39). The myth, therefore, 
could be apprehended as an affirmation or reaffirm ation of Sangir-Talauds 
relation with Magindanao since time began. M angunsalangi’s journey to 
Sangir-Talaud Islands and his return  to Mindanao in his old age evoke 
continuity ra ther than  severance of relations, which m irrors the tendency of 
families in the area to move out to places but retain  their connections with 
their ancestors through documentation of where one has established his 
family. Moreover, the m yth provides unity to an otherwise fragmented 
kingdoms of Sangir-Talaud by implying common ancestry of all the 
kingdoms. On the other hand, the m yth could also be an attem pt to shore- 
up the prestige of the various kingdoms in the area by tracing lineage to a 
great Sultanate. In the mythological representation of the islands under 
T ernate’s rule, Sangir-Talaud Islands and North Sulawesi are excluded; 
thus, they were never regarded as true part of M aluku (Andaya L., 
1993:112).
The link from Cotabato to Sangir leads back to Sarangani Island 
when in mid-14th century, according to local history, a certain Datu Panurat 
from Tabukan-m atua moved to the island to escape from Hinduism imposed 
by the M ajapahit kingdom (Municipality of Sarangani, 1996; Hayase, Non 
& Ulaen, 1999:40-43).16 He decided to settle and raise his clan in the island. 
The name of the islands, Sarangani and Balut, comes from the names of 
P anu ra t’s two sons, Balud and Sarangani.17 Datu P anura t actively traded 
with communities in Margos, Gian and along the Davao Gulf areas. He was 
a literate m an and fluent in Arabic because he was able to write a tarsila. 
After P anu ra t’s death ,18 his two sons became the leaders of the clan; while 
his brothers and sisters settled in Tugis (now South Cotabato), Mati, Davao
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O riental and Batulaki. This perhaps account for Laarhoven’s note th a t the 
King of Tabukan has relatives in Kalangan and Mati Bay (1989:117).
Towards the end of 16th century, Dutch records show th a t Sarangani 
island was home to Datu Mangada, king of K andahar (located on the 
northern part of Sangir Island), who also ruled over Tugis and Davao Gulf 
a rea .19 His family had close relations with the Buayan kingdom. M angada’s 
ancestry is traced to Rajah W agama who ruled K andahar in 15th century 
and who was later succeeded by a Mindanao royalty, Sarib Mansyur, who is 
said to have introduced Islam in Sangihe (“Philipina, 2000).20 He had a 
daughter named Fatim a who m arried Sultan Achmad Mehegulangi from 
Mindanao. The union brought forth one son named Boaisang (Wuisang) 
who later became the first Sultan of Kendahe but ruled from Mindanao. 
Boaisang or Buisan is the father of M angada and at the time of Kudarat, he 
was somewhere in the Davao Gulf region or in Tugis. It is said th a t the 
daughter of Buisan m arried M arkus Dalore, a rajah from Tabukan who 
gave the state  of M akiwulaeng as bride price (“Philipina, 2000). From then 
on, K andahar was deemed to rule a part of Tabukan.
K andahar and Tabukan’s connection with Davao Gulf and Sarangani 
corroborates the genealogies of Sangils now living in the area.21 Notable in 
the genealogies are the presence and movement of family members to 
settlem ents within the Davao Gulf and Saranggani Bay areas, such as 
Gian, Tugis, and Jose Abad Santos. Throughout generations, there were 
also in term itten t m arriages with people from Magindanao. This could be 
inferred as one way of expanding family relations, opening new territories, 
or m aintaining influence in the area.
Interm arriage of the Sangirese with local kingdoms in the Davao 
Gulf region included even ‘non-aligned’ kingdoms like the Kalagans. This 
kingdom is not a tribu tary  to Magindanao or Ternate Sultanate 
(Laarhoven, 1989:118). Local chiefs, however, such as 17th century King
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Bessie Hossaru, ensures th a t provisions are available and prices are lower 
if M agindanao’s leaders come to trade (Laarhoven, 1989:118). The 
genealogy of the current Kalangan or Kaagan Datu of M adaum in Davao 
del Norte traces their origin to a Sangir captive of Magindanao nobility, 
K apitan Laut, who is m arried to a Kaagan (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 
1999:54). According to Non, the Datu of Madaum is one of the three original 
Datus of Davao area (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999:54). At present, there are 
two groups of Kalagan, the Christianized Kalagans and the Islamized 
Kaagans. The Spaniards m ust have been able to convert part of the 
Kalagans in the 1800s which was deemed as mere rum or in 1705 
(Laarhoven, 1989:118).
Political Relations
While the genealogies show th a t Magindanao and the Sangir- 
Talauds have been in close relations for quite some time, it would only be at 
the beginning of the 17th century th a t historical accounts would show 
Magindanao enforcing influence in the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms. In 1625, 
Q udarat attacked Sarangani Islands and expelled Datu Mangada 
(Laarhoven, 1989:105), because of the island’s strategic value to the 
expanding Magindanao sultanate. It is the east-west route from Sulu, 
Borneo and Sangihe to the Davao Gulf region, an excellent place for 
shipbuilding and repair, and source of beeswax (Laarhoven, 1986:47). 
Sarangani from then on became a tributary  of Magindanao and no trade 
with foreigners was perm itted w ithout consent from the Sultan. Q udarat 
also made the island the warehouse for his trade goods. Barham an, 
Q udarat’s grandson, would fully take over the control of Davao Gulf and 
Sarangani during his reign. Dutch records show th a t there were about 
seventeen settlem ents in the Davao Gulf which were tributary  to the 
Magindanao Sultanate in th is area (Laarhoven, 1990:173).
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At the time of the reign of Barham an (around 1678),22 according to 
Laarhoven, Sarangani Island, Davao Gulf settlem ents, and the Sangir- 
Talaud Islands comprised one of M agindanao’s five spheres of influence 
(1989:169-174).23 The other areas of influence included the: (1) settlem ents 
in Zamboanga Peninsula and Basilan, including the Subanons; (2) Iranuns 
and Badjaos residing along the coasts of Pulangi and Simoay Rivers and 
Lake Lanao; (3) communities along the Sarangani Bay and the Tirurays; (4) 
inland settlem ents in the Buayan area and the Manobos. Each of these 
spheres contributes to the Sultanate, either in goods or services, but not 
totally controlled by the Sultanate. This kind of arrangem ent may seem 
incoherent with modern concepts of state power, but coherence in this 
context is achieved through the principles of reciprocity, redistribution and 
exchange.
The Badjaus, for instance, took on a variety of sea-related roles 
acting as boat makers, messengers, tribute collectors, coast guards, and 
sometimes as interpreters or envoys. In times of perilous journeys on behalf 
of the Sultan, the Badjaos’ children were taken care of by the Sultanate. 
Despite assum ing these functions in the Sultanate, the Badjaus continued 
to roam the seas on their own and to regularly fish in the Moluccas and 
Celebes. While the Sultanate’s relationship with the Manobos was purely 
trade-orientated, gold in exchange for cloth and the local chief only 
transacts with the Sultan.
Sultan B arham an further extended his influence into Sangir through 
his m arriage with Basing, the daughter of the first Sultan of Sangir, 
Makalindi, and Timbang Saribu (Saleeby, 1976:49).24 Laarhoven mentions 
th a t B arham an also had a queen, who was the sister of the gugugu  (prime 
minister) of the King of Tabukan (1989:65). W hether or not they were the 
same woman, the m arriage could be inferred as part of B arham an’s effort to 
expand M agindanao’s influence in Sangir-Talaud kingdoms, which by this 
time have switched allegiance to the Dutch VOC. It could also be th a t
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B arham an was acting on the request of then Ternate Sultan Amsterdam to 
quell Dutch Christianization missions in the Sangir-Talaud Islands 
(Laarhoven, 1989:65). B arham an was quite involved in Sangir issues 
because by 1680, the Dutch suspected him of interfering in Muslim affairs 
in the island. According to Laarhoven, the kinship and Islamic ties of 
Magindanao with Sangir is one of the reasons why the Dutch could not 
exercise param ount authority over the area (1989:65). It could also be 
possible th a t the Dutch did force their rule in the Sangir-Talaud areas so as 
not to antagonize Magindanao, which was their prim ary trading partner in 
the area during this period.
In another Magindanao narrative, Rajah M analatan of Sangir, 
supposedly the brother of Basing who succeeded their father Makalindi, 
ceded Salibabo Island and part of Talaud Island in favor of his nephew, 
Sultan M anamir of Magindanao and thus, he was also known as Sultan of 
Sangir (Laarhoven, 1989:iii-iv; Forrest, 1971:320). There are no records 
however, of w hat transpired after this m arriage and even of B arham an’s 
continuing influence in the island. I t was, however, during B arham an’s rule 
th a t Muslim Sangirs escaping the Christianization of Sangir-Talaud islands 
were openly welcomed into the Magindanao Sultanate. These Sangirs 
escapees would form part of the present-day Sangil, one of the thirteen 
Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao. In the local history of Sarangani 
Island, the Sangils were recorded as descendant of Datu Panurat 
(Municipality of Saranggani, 1996), which is partly true  since they all share 
the same ancestry. A 1983 data  shows th a t there are around 77,000 Sangils 
and they can be found in Balut Island, Sarangani Bay, Davao City, and 
coastal areas of Maasim, Maitum, Kiamba, and Gian, South Cotabato (“A 
Profile,” 1987:35). By 1990, their population would decline considerably at 
7,483, (Hayase, 2007:80) perhaps because of interm arriages and integration 
with other local groups, such as the Kalagans and Bl’aans, they have taken 
other identities. Their contemporary locations, however, were in earlier 
times also the destination areas of their ancestors.
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Dutch sources suggest Magindanao’s control over Sarangani Island 
was patchy. In 1688, the King of K andahar ceded Sarangani Island, areas 
around Davao Gulf, and the eastern coast of Mindanao to the Dutch in 
exchange for m ilitary protection (Laarhoven, 1989:60; Majul, 1973:175). 
This was part of the effort of king to reclaim influence over the area from 
Magindanao. Around 1693-1695, Dutchmen reported to Barham an the 
presence of the son of the King of K andahar with a well-known Nakoda 
Abdul from Sangir in Sarangani Island and th a t they had a pascedule to 
Butuan. The Dutchmen were quite perplexed to find a son of the expelled 
king of the island taking a break in the area. The son mentioned Barham an 
has usurped his father powers (Laarhoven, 1989:129). Majul (1973:175), 
perhaps because of lim ited information, assumed like the Dutch, tha t 
indeed Barham an or Magindanao did not have control over the island.
The Dutch perspective on control and territory was, however, based 
on a different framework of territoriality, as noted by Laarhoven 
(1989:129). During this period, the island may be tribu tary  of Magindanao, 
bu t it is not completely sealed off from interaction with other kingdoms, 
such as in the case of Kandahar. Moreover, the losing local ruling elite 
rem ain in his kingdom while paying homage to the center. This is evident 
in B arham an’s response to the Dutch report where he mentioned th a t 
during his grandfather’s reign, Datu Buisan of K andahar ruled on his 
grandfather’s behalf on the Davao Gulf areas (Laarhoven, 1989:129). In 
another instance, during a request of Spaniards to build a fort in 
Sarangani, Barham an apparently referred the Spaniards to Datu Buisan, 
the father of the King of K andahar (Laarhoven, 1989:129). Laarhoven 
assumes th a t it was B arham an’s ploy to misled the Spaniards th a t the 
island is under a Sangir king and therefore, under Dutch protection, which 
the Spaniards would not dare face off with (1989:129-130). Towards the 
decline of the Magindanao Sultanate, the King of K andahar again signed 
treaties with the Dutch over Sarangani to regain the island. The Dutch, as 
reported by Ileto, perhaps understanding the value of the island and to
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counteract the Spanish re-entry in Mindanao, implanted a stone tablet with 
the initials V.O.C. and claim the island as part of Ternate (1971:26).
Amidst the interweaving of personal relations, economic interests 
and political pursuits, the preceding discussion shows th a t the Sulu- 
Sulawesi Sea has never acted as a boundary but ra ther a space of 
connections, networks, and exchange. These linkages are m arked not only 
in the m arkets and ports but more so in myths and family narratives. 
Underlying the linkages and alliances built on trade and political 
maneuverings are histories woven into the personal and oral narratives 
th a t continue to be remembered by family members and folklore long after 
the pre-colonial port-polities are gone. These political dynamics, along with 
the historical linkages and ties in the Sulu-Sulawesi, were displaced by the 
colonial projects with the retu rn  of the Spanish in Mindanao and followed 
later on by the Americans.
A ltering the P o litica l Space: C olonial P rojects in  M indanao and  
N orth Su law esi
The return  of Spain to Mindanao at the s ta rt of 18th century marked 
the reconfiguration of the political, economic and cultural relations in the 
Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, which were continued by its American successor. 
Through the use of diplomacy and m ilitary might, Spain completed the 
subdivision of the Sulu-Sulawesi region among the competing European 
powers in the area. W ith the subjugation of the two most powerful 
su ltanates in the area, the historical network of Mindanao with its partners 
across the Sulu-Sulawesi was weakened and reoriented towards the 
economic and political centers of the colony. Spain’s redefinition of the 
territorial basis of political authority in the area would lay the groundwork 
for the eventual dissolution of local ru lers’ traditional sources of power 
during American rule.
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Spain's renewed engagement with Mindanao began by striking down 
regional trade, the lifeline of the Sultanates and settlem ents in the area, as 
they were redirected towards the commercial interests of the colony. The 
process started  with Spain’s re-establishm ent of the Zamboanga fort, 
strategically located at the channel where goods coming from China into 
Magindanao pass. Chinese junks were prevented by Spain from calling at 
Magindanao port (Ileto, 1971:10). This seriously weakened the economic 
base of the Magindanao Sultanate as it could no longer directly secure 
goods coming from China and was relegated to supplying rice to then 
expanding Sulu Sultanate in exchange for Chinese goods (McKenna, 
1998:77). The Iranuns and Badjaos, who were two of the key allies of 
Magindanao, shifted to Sulu as their economic conditions begun to 
deteriorate. Some of the Badjaos moved their operation to M acassar (Ileto, 
1971:10). The final erosion of M agindanao control over trade would happen 
as in ternal political rivalry and civil war engulfed the Sultanate, 
propitiously at the time of Spain’s retu rn  to Mindanao.
The alliance th a t made M agindanao a powerful Sultanate in the area 
would crumble in 1730s as power struggles among heirs to the Sultanate 
erupted. The opportune time for Spain to intervene came when the Sultan 
of Magindanao requested protection against his rival powers. The 
occupation of Pollock Point, a t the mouth of the Pulangi River, by the 
responding Spanish navy opened the doors to eventual occupation of the 
coastal kingdom of Magindanao (Ileto, 1971:8-10). By 1837, Magindanao in 
a treaty  with Spain relinquished de facto control of trade at the Pulangi 
River and even the selection of rulers in the Sultanate (Ileto, 1971:13). This 
did not sit well with former tributaries, many of which repudiated their 
relationship with the Sultanate (Ileto, 1971:13). The Sultanate’s sphere of 
influence was eventually reduced to immediate areas near the mouth of the 
Pulangi River. The final incorporation of Magindanao into the Spanish 
colony occurred in 1861 when it was renamed Cotabato and reduced as one 
of the five districts of the politico-military government of Mindanao. The
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S ultanate’s former realm s of influence were now co-equals administratively, 
with Zamboanga and Davao (including Gian and Sarangani Bay 
settlem ents) comprising the two other districts in the southwestern/eastern 
sections of Mindanao. The other districts were Misamis and Surigao in the 
northw estern/eastern parts of Mindanao.
While the coastal kingdom of Magindanao capitulated relatively 
easily to Spain’s colonial design, the inland Buayan kingdom, under the 
leadership of Datu Uto, waged fierce resistance against Spain. When 
Pollock Point was occupied by Spain and closed off Buayan’s immediate 
access to the sea, it exploited its long fam iliar alternative route to 
Sarangani Bay. Buayan rem ained free of Spanish control until the late 19th 
century. In part because the Spanish belatedly realized th a t there was an 
alternative route to the sea from the upper settlem ents of Magindanao 
(Ileto, 1971:25) th a t negated their control of the m outh of the Pulangi. This 
alternative outlet for Buayan made the Sarangani area central to Datu 
Uto’s campaign to m aintain the economic support to its alliance and 
acquisition of arms.
The datus and traders displaced by naval campaigns in Sulu and 
occupation of Davao would converge in Sarangani Bay, thus providing Uto 
with additional sources of support for its anti-Spanish campaign (Ileto, 
1971:26-27). This site of traditional commerce would be transform ed into a 
large-scale site of “smuggling” and “piracy”, as the Spanish authorities 
interpreted them to be, from Sulu to the Sangir archipelago and to British- 
controlled ports such as Singapore. To inhabitants of the Bay, however, this 
trade was between “commercial friends” (Ileto, 1971:26) and nothing 
extraordinary. Based on Spanish reports, Ileto notes the large movements 
of Chinese and Christian traders, including foreign m erchants, to Gian and 
Sarangani Bay to take advantage of the commerce (1971:27). One report 
mentioned an Indian trader with commercial links in Davao moving 
opposite Sarangani Island with one hundred Sangir Moro families (Ileto,
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1971:27). Thus, while the coastal kingdom of Magindano saw it trade 
relations reoriented towards Manila, the Buayan kingdom for a time 
relished the relations of former traditional Magindanao allies and external 
trade with Malay and Indonesian commercial worlds (Ileto, 1971:28). Uto 
would eventually be defeated by Spain breaking the alliance he had with 
local chiefs, ending the slave trade, and gaining control of Gian and 
Sarangani Bay.
The Sangir-Talauds continued to visit the Sarangani Islands despite 
the fall of Magindanao as reflected in the accounts of Spanish friars around 
the end of nineteenth century:
Every year people from Talao come to these islands. They are 
peaceful and industrious and come to sell textiles and various 
kinds of mats. Their bancas are as big as schooners and have a 
special shape, but they don’t dare enter the bays of Sarangani 
and Davao because they are afraid of the Moros and the 
Manobos. When F a ther More wrote about this, it was only a 
few years earlier th a t the Moros had captured one of their 
pancos in Mangkili, killing the crew with the exception of one 
m an who was able to escape from the carnage and was later 
baptized in Davao shortly before the arrival of the Jesuits in 
this district. D uring the months of September and October, 
Talao seamen used to sail along the coasts from Culam an up to 
Cape San Agustin. In 1884 Father Pastells saw two of their 
large pancaos which arrived a t H inatuan in bad shape, after 
being blown by th ithe r by the tarangin or southwind. They had 
been coasting up to Pundaguitan to get a t the proper altitude 
for their re tu rn  trip  by making use of the first northwind. 
Upon leaving the reduction of H inatuan, the helm sm an of one 
of those pancos promised the inspector th a t upon their next 
voyage they would bring some families along to settle here, 
because due to prolonged drought they suffered hunger for 
most of the year (Schreurs, 1998:42).
There is not much historical information as to w hat happened to the 
Sangir-Talaud settlem ents in Sarangani Bay and along the Davao Gulf 
areas. W hat could be surm ised based on the genealogies is th a t they 
became part of the Muslim indigenous groups in the area and were later
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classified as part of the Sangil community. A num ber of the present datus 
in the area trace their lineage to Sangir. The demarcation of the boundary 
between the Dutch and Spanish territories disconnected them from their 
kinfolks across the border. With the Christianization of the Sangir-Talaud 
archipelago by the Dutch, this disconnection heightened. This division was 
perm anently fixed later in the formation of the postcolonial nation-state, as 
the Sangils and Sangirs take on the national identities of their respective 
nation-states, as Filipinos and Indonesians, respectively.
On the eve of American take-over of the Philippines, Spain had 
succeeded in reconfiguring the relations of Magindanao with its neighbors 
across the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. The political alliances were now gone. While 
the large scale inter-island commerce has been reduced to a much smaller 
scale, Spain was not fully able to control its borders in Mindanao. Towards 
the end of Spanish rule in Mindanao, Gian and the Sarangani Bay 
m aintained their reputation as places for smugglers and traders of goods, 
such as opium and firearm s (W arren, 1981:130).
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Dutch-Spanish border in 
Mindanao, a similar process of adm inistrative reorganization has taken 
place in the Sangir-Talaud Islands and North Sulawesi after the Batavia 
(Jakarta)-based Dutch government has taken control of the area. The vast 
zone of the Ternate Sultanate was now subdivided into adm inistrative 
territories. The Sangir-Talaud Islands were initially placed under the 
jurisdiction of the governor of Maluku and later become part of the 
residency of Manado. The kingdoms were transform ed into adm inistrative 
units with the local rajas becoming its leaders (Ulaen, 2003:81). The varied 
networks of trade in the archipelago were now all directed towards Batavia. 
As these networks were organized into a variety of layers -  from the 
network of smaller islands to regional networks of trade, like those based in 
Manado and Ternate, and then, eventually to Batavia, those at the margins 
were less able to reap the benefits of trade. The case of Sangir-Talaud
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Islands, which in earlier times were able to freely trade with varied centers 
both in Sulawesi and Mindanao, was now forced to link with Manado. 
Ulaen notes tha t this led to the m arginalization of the Sangir-Talaud 
Islands, a process which continues until the present (2003:160).
C onclusion
The pre-colonial space of the modern-day border region of 
Southeastern Mindanao and North Sulawesi was characterized by fluidity 
and interlocking relations either through trade, interm arriages, or politics. 
As Lapian (2003) pointed out, it was not only a political-economic space, but 
also a socio-cultural unit overriding the boundaries set forth by colonialism 
(3). Inter-island commerce was extensive as recorded in historical accounts, 
as well as, the inter-island familial relations and exchanges as 
dem onstrated in the interlaced genealogies and folk narratives. Mobility of 
people and goods, therefore, were familiar scenes in this m aritim e region. 
Port-polities, like Magindanao, freely welcomed and sought out a variety of 
peoples to serve their hum an resource and trading needs. The openness of 
the Magindanao polity is perhaps best captured in Sultan Barham an’s 
letter to Governor van der Duyn in 1693 in which he state  th a t “the people 
of Magindanao certainly are known under one name but consists of many 
nations” (Laarhoven, 1989:109).
The subject border region of this study was in fact the “border region” 
of the Sultanates of Ternate and Magindanao. In contrast to modern 
notions of border areas, however, the kingdoms in Sarangani Island, 
Sangir-Talaud archipelago and Davao Gulf areas in pre-colonial period 
were political centers in their own right and able to chart their own political 
relations. The border did not mean exclusive domination of one particular 
powerful Sultanate but ra ther crossroads of interlacing alliances. It m eant 
more of a periphery because of its distance from the center but did not 
evoke territorial limits or ends of the kingdom. The Sangir-Talauds were
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among the indigenous settlers of this border region. Caught in the 
crossroads of competing powers and centers, their history, politics, and 
kinship would crisscross the seas, from M agindanao to Ternate, at the very 
least.
The re-entry of Spain in the Mindanao reconfigured the organization 
of traditional political space in the area. M agindanao’s trading network 
w ith its allied polities in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea was cut-off and redirected 
towards colonial economic interests. The political structure defined by 
alliances and personal relations gave way to a new political structure 
defined according to adm inistrative territorial units tied up to the central 
government of the colony in Manila. The political subdivision of the Sulu- 
Sulawesi Sea among the three colonial powers in the area -  the Dutch, 
British, and Spanish, led to the dislocation and separation of communities 
whose lives bisect these territories, such as the Sangir-Talauds who were 
alienated from their relations in Mindanao.
The Sulu-Suluwesi Sea, however, rem ained a zone of contact and the 
ancient m aritim e highways continued to be crossed with scant regard for 
the territorial trappings of the colonial projects. Colonial mindsets would 
not acknowledge the traditional fluidity of relations so th a t the term s 
“piracy” and “smuggling” came into existence to denote the new rules 
established by the colonial state. These term s, likewise, denote the fragile 
hold of the colonial state  on its boundaries, a condition th a t continued 
during the American and postcolonial periods.
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Chapter III
Sangir-Talaud Sojourners and S ettlers in  M indanao:
1900-2009
The entry of the Americans into Mindanao in 1900 ushered in a new era 
during which the Sangir-Talauds found their way back into Southeastern 
Mindanao. This time, however, their entry took place within the framework 
of the modern nation-state system. While previous crossings of the sea were 
quite free and w ithout a ttendant transform ation in social and political 
position, w ithin the new state system border crossers had to inevitably 
engage with the state and its agents and deal with the social and legal 
structures of immigration and citizenship. The Sangir-Talauds in Mindanao 
are now classified in state  parlance as Indonesians when in earlier times 
they were simply the Sangirs or Talauds. The Sangir-Talauds continue to 
move in and out of Mindanao but they now occupy a liminal position in 
Mindanao as illegal en tran ts and non-citizens of the state. The Americans 
introduced immigration and customs procedures redefining rules of access 
and passage but they and the postcolonial Philippine state  did not succeed 
totally in sealing off the border. The Sangir-Talauds defied the borders and 
instead took advantage of w hat it could offer to better their lives. The first 
section maps out the extent of dispersion of Sangir-Talauds in eight 
provinces in southeastern Mindanao. The second section examines how the 
border is redefined as the Sangir-Talauds built their lives around it. The 
third section looks a t issues contemporary m igrant settlers face, their 
m arginality, and how they make sense of being im m igrants.
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D ocum enting the U ndocum ented
The demographic profile of the Sangir-Talauds in Southeastern 
Mindanao is based on a household survey and interviews conducted 
between 2002-2005 in seven municipalities (Gian, Sarangani, Isulan, 
Esperanza, Norallah) and cities (Davao, General Santos) in Mindanao. Of 
the 204 respondents, 72% were male heads of households, 26% female 
spouses, and 1% oldest members of the household. Around 14% were 
Filipino spouses of Indonesian nationals. More than  half of them  were 
between the ages of 19-44. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents were 
born in Indonesia and almost all of them  hail from the Sangir-Talaud 
archipelago.
Map 3. Documented locations of Indonesians in Mindanao
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There is a paucity of available data on the num ber of Sangir-Talauds 
or Indonesians in Mindanao. From the time their presence became a 
national issue in the 1960s, no comprehensive mapping has been done by 
the Philippine government. Local government offices also do not have 
accurate data. The lack of data  is partly because the Indonesians have not 
been of major concern, except in times of political and security concerns and 
was also due to the lack of state capacity to gather data and monitor its 
peripheries. Estim ates given in the 1960s are surprisingly sim ilar to 
estim ates forty years later. A 2000 survey of the Philippine Bureau of 
Immigration (BI) shows th a t there are a t least 6,869 Indonesians in 
Mindanao (see table 1). While the survey by the Indonesian Consulate in 
Davao City on the same year (August 2000), reflects a slightly higher 
population of 8,070 and it did not cover some of the areas surveyed by BI. 
The discrepancy in the BI data  is partly  due to it being based only on 
Indonesians who showed up during the survey in the interview sites and 
did not involve house-to-house mapping. Both population surveys, however, 
are significantly lower than  the estim ate by local officials and press, which 
is 10,000 to 15,000 Clndons make”, 2004: A17). This estim ate, on the other 
hand, does not differ considerably from the estim ate of 12,000 made by the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1965. The variety in estim ates stems 
from a variety of factors, aside from the s ta te ’s fleeting interest and lack of 
capacity to monitor the border. The Indonesian are widely dispersed 
geographically, some of these areas are difficult to reach. Some of the 
Indonesians are also very mobile because of their work, such as the 
seafarers or itineran t farm hands. There was a general impression during 
the interviews with local government and imm igration officials th a t the 
population could be around 20,000.
The Indonesians are spread quite widely in at least 25 municipalities 
and cities in eights provinces in Southeastern Mindanao (see Map 3 and 
Table 1); a significant num ber of which are located in the municipalities of 
Jose Abad Santos, Sarangani, Gian, Isulan, and General Santos City. The
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m unicipalities of Sarangani, Jose Abad Santos, and Gian are the usual 
entry points and traditional settlem ent areas of Indonesians, thus 
explaining the large concentration of m igrants in these areas.
Table 1. Population of Indonesians in Mindanao by Province, 
Municipality/ City
Province, Municipality/City Bureau of Imm igration
Indonesian
Consulate
1. Davao City and Davao del Norte
a. Davao City 220 397
b. Samal 26
c. Tagum 23
2. Davao del Sur
a. Sarangani 1,838 2,876
b. Don Marcelino 31
c. Sta. M aria 38 137
d. M alita 2 382
3. Davao O riental
a. Gov. Genoroso 143
b. Lupon 10
c. Sigaboy 104
d. Mati 40
4. North Cotabato
a. Kabacan 70 184
b. Kidapawan 39
5. South Cotabato
a. Norala 204
b. Banga 100
c. Tupi 116
d. General Santos City 679 656
e. (Brgy. Bukid and Dukay) 34
6. Sarangani
a. Gian 2,157 2,306
b. M aitum 40
c. M alapatan 86
d. Kiamba 257 417
e. Alabel 35
f. M aasim 33
g. (Brgy. Kiogam) 112
7. Sultan K udarat
a. Isulan 125 715
b. Esperanza 276
Total 6,869 8,070
Sources: 2000 Indonesian National Survey, Bureau of Immigration, Davao 
City; 2000 D aftar Pem ukim an WNI di Wilaya Kerja, KJRI Davao City. The 
municipality affiliation of some barangays could not be ascertained.
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M indanao and the A m erican C olonization  Program
The Americans occupied Mindanao a t the beginning of the tw entieth 
century. Under their rule, the incorporation of Mindanao into the 
Philippine polity was completed. The Muslims again vigorously resisted 
such efforts but with a fragmented community, they had little recourse but 
to follow the new colonial design. Mindanao was politically subdivided into 
adm inistrative territories -  barangay, m unicipalities, districts, provinces -  
by the Americans to facilitate the governance of the area. This would finally 
erode the rule of traditional chiefdoms in the area (Abinales, 2000b:207). 
The establishm ent of immigration and customs rules and offices in 
Mindanao paved the way for the ‘organized’ flow of goods and people, failure 
to comply m eant serious legal repercussions (Abinales, 2000b:207). The 
emergence of new and young leaders, albeit most of them descendants of 
the great Sultans of Mindanao, educated and bred in an American system 
and more inclined towards working with the center inevitably escalated the 
integration of Mindanao into the political realm of the colony (Abinales, 
2000a:60). The sea as a border began to take shape as the Americans 
started to configure the colony’s m aritim e limits. The borders, however, 
remained porous to “piracy” and “smuggling,” as evidenced by foreign goods 
th a t found its way into the m arkets and stores of Mindanao (Abinales, 
2000b:223).
Mindanao was represented by the Americans as the “frontier” of the 
Philippine state, “the land of promise and unlim ited opportunity” (Pelzer, 
1948:127). W ernstedt and Simkins note th a t the area was “isolated from 
the principals centers of Spanish activities and the island failed to 
participate to any significant degree in the economic and political 
development of the Philippines” and failed to develop significantly and 
increase its population (1965:84-85). An imagery th a t is patently flawed 
considering M indanao’s central role in the pre-colonial trade of the Sulu- 
Sulawesi but nonetheless it was effectively used by the Americans to justify
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its program of development and settlem ent of Mindanao starting in 1900. 
To encourage development and migration, the Public Land Act was 
implemented in 1903 which perm itted the sale or lease of public lands 
(W ernstedt & Simkins, 1965:87). Enterprising American servicemen and a 
few European and Japanese investors began transform ing the vast plains of 
Mindanao into agricultural plantations. By 1909, according to Corsino, 
there were around “40 plantations, ranging from 100 to 1,024 hectares or 
more, comprised of 2,670,000 hills of hemp and 122,000 coconut trees” 
(1981:105). The plantations soon spread to coastal areas of Cotabato and 
Sarangani Bay (Corsino, 1981:107). Despite the success of most plantations, 
Mindanao still failed to a ttrac t m igrants and workers to the extent th a t 
there was a severe labor shortage in the abaca plantations (Villanueva, 
1956:47). The Americans decided to actively encourage migration by 
establishing agricultural colonies between 1913 and 1917, six in the 
province of Cotabato (including Gian) and one in the province of Lanao 
(Pelzer, 1948:129). The colonies failed to a ttrac t m igrants because of ill- 
chosen sites and the settlers lacked farm ing experience (Pelzer, 1948:1320. 
By 1939, the Commonwealth government established the National Land 
Settlem ent Project (NLSA), which oversaw the creation of four settlem ents 
(Polomolok, Marbel, Tupi, and Lagao) in the Koronadal Valley, the pre­
colonial domain of the Buayan kingdom. Under NLSA, each settler was 
provided with a six hectare farm, access to credit and technical support to 
enable them s ta rt a new life. The NLSA task  was not completed because of 
World W ar II. Its considerable success, however, encouraged the 
government to continue the program after the w ar (Abinales, 2000a:97). 
According to W ernstedt and Simkins, “the total cultivated area of Mindanao 
increased approximately from two million acres in 1948 to more than  4.2. 
million acres in 1960” (1965:102).
The Sangir-Talauds took part in th is American-led development of 
Mindanao, but as silent settlers, unrecorded and undocumented. The 
Sangir-Talauds came in the early 1900s and joined in the “colonization” of
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Mindanao as farm hands, coconut planters, and settlers. Many became 
“pioneers” by themselves as they cleared lands for farms and plant the first 
sets of abaca, coconuts and even pineapples in Mindanao. They followed the 
Filipino settlers as they opened up lands and built new lives in these 
settlem ents. Villano-Campado (1989), in her study of the NLSA settlem ent 
program in Koronadal Valley, noted th a t the pre-war Filipino settlers met 
the Sangir-Talauds when they came in Cotabato (8). Most of their present 
locations were historically the pioneer settlem ents in Mindanao -  Gian, 
Cotabato, and Koronadal Valley areas. Many of these pioneers rem ained 
and spent their lives in Mindanao illegally, but not necessarily unwanted 
and unwelcomed.
The Sangir-Talauds R eturn to M indanao: R eclaim ing and
R edefin ing the Border
The border as stated in the first chapter not only divides political 
territories but also areas of opportunity and restriction. It highlights, 
among others, economic disparities and better life prospects. Border peoples 
exploit this opportunity by building their lives and livelihoods around w hat 
the border offers. In turn , giving shape to the m argins as sites of 
opportunities and exchange ra ther than  as sites of control and division. 
W ithout enforcement and control, the border becomes even captive to the 
interests of those who cross them. The case of the Sangir-Talauds is 
illustrative. At the beginning of the tw entieth century, they were faced with 
drought, epidemics, and shortage of agricultural land (Henley, 2005:154- 
161). Aside from the natural disasters th a t plague the archipelago, it could 
be argued th a t the economy of the area has deteriorated considerably after 
traditional m aritim e trade was cut-off. These Islands whose prim ary 
economy was based on the sea trade were now forced to sustain a growing 
population on a limited area of land. W ith the lack of better options, the 
tendency is to move to other areas to find a living.
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These factors accelerated the movement of young men from the 
Sangir-Talaud area moving to escape constricting family ties and thus 
further depriving the island of the needed hum an resource (Henley, 
2005:161). Many of the m igrants found work in European plantations in 
M inahasa and the North Moluccas. O thers found their way to Mindanao 
through fam iliar patterns of mobility by traditional boats and in large 
groups. Migration continued into the middle of tw entieth century and did 
not slow down even during the 1930s economic depression (Henley, 
2005:161). The movement to Mindanao persists up to the present.
The first recorded entry of the Sangir-Taiauds during the American 
period was in 1918 when Calunao Pangelawan, an Indonesian, came into 
Balut Island to proselytize among the Sangirs and Bl’aans (Municipality of 
Sarangani, 1996). It could be inferred th a t there was a sizeable num ber of 
Sangir-Taiauds in the island to m erit a m issionary’s work (assuming all 
converts were m igrants and Sangir-Taiauds). An American exploratory 
mission in Balut Island in 1902 noted th a t were a few Sangils in the area 
(Corcino, 1998:117). W hether these are the new en tran ts to area or the 
Sangir Muslims of yesteryears is not certain. Pangelawan’s work would be 
continued la ter by Benjamin and Herm an M ahaling.25 Sangir residents of 
the Island believe th a t some of their kinfolk have been on the island 
perhaps one or two generations ahead of Pangelawan and M ahaling 
(Cullamar-Tan, 1989:93). It is interesting to note th a t many, however, 
would have vague, or no, knowledge at all of the pre-colonial relations 
between Mindanao and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. Thus, unknowingly, 
many retrace the footpaths of their ancestors in Mindanao as they seek 
work and livelihood. In turn , they established new paths for their kinfolks 
who followed them later.
The age-old skills of Sangir-Taiauds in coconut farming became 
handy when they moved to Mindanao. The pioneer settlers in the 
Sarangani and Balut Islands were the first to clear the lands and planted
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them with coconut trees. On Sarangani Beach in Balut Island, residents 
said one could determ ine how long they have been in the area based on the 
age of coconut trees th a t dot their beachside church. While legally they 
were not allowed to own land, many of these pioneer settlers became big 
landowners. Raharto (2000) reported th a t around 35% of the families who 
lived in Kawio, Kawaluso, and Marore Islands owned coconut trees in Balut 
and Sarangani Islands (240). Cahangang Layang, for instance, owned 
around 33 hectares of coconut plantation in Sarangani (Cullamar-Tan, 
1989:170-171). While Yanis, in an interview in 2002, said his family used to 
own more than  20 hectares but was taken away from him by a local Filipino 
resident when issues of rightful ownership propped up in the 1960s. He said 
the land was given to his father by a native Bl’aan. Coconut farm ing and 
copra production rem ain a prim ary source of agricultural income by the 
Municipality of Sarangani. It continues as well as one of the prim ary 
occupations of the Sangir-Talauds in the island.
Image 1. Residences of Sangir-Talud settlers in Patirang, Balut Island with 
coconut plantations in the background.
Moreover, a num ber of Sangir-Talaud settlers would assume political 
roles, albeit w ithin the village level, particularly in the Sarangani and
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Balut Islands. H erm an Mahaling and Jonathan  Pareda were appointed as 
barangay councilors by special dispensation from the Philippine 
Commonwealth government, while two of M ahaling’s sons served during 
World W ar II as USAFE members (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:173, 176-178). 
While Layang served as “teniente del barrio” or barangay chief for ten years 
(Cullamar-Tan, 1989:170-171). O thers would take odd jobs, such as Herman 
Timpumesa, who worked as guide for visiting Americans in Balut Island in 
the 1940s.26
The Sangir-Talauds would also be linked with the lives of Spanish 
“pioneers” who heeded the call of the Americans. The daughter of Calunao 
Pangilawan m arried Venancio de Arce, a Spanish journalist and later 
became the ‘presidente’ (mayor) of Sarangani or Balut (Cullamar-Tan, 1989, 
174-175).27 According to descendants of Don Tranquilino Ruiz, who led the 
first settlem ent in Gian, their grandfather and even some of his neighbors 
had Sangir househelpers.28 There is also a rum or among the old residents of 
General Santos City th a t the one of the Olarte brothers, who owned vast 
tracts of land in General Santos City and Sarangani Island, m arried an 
Indonesian with Dutch ancestry. One of the Filipino seafarers, who used to 
work for a fishing company in the city, said th a t the Olartes had families 
and relatives in the Sangir Islands. Rumors perhaps, but nonetheless, 
reflect the interlinked histories of m igrants -  Filipinos, Spanish and 
Sangir-Talauds -  in Mindanao.
The factors th a t would drive the early Sangir-Talauds to Mindanao 
were not significantly different to la ter border crossers. Around sixty-eight 
percent of Indonesian-born respondents for the household survey conducted 
in 2002 said th a t they came to find work and better life (see Table 2). Some 
came on their own, while others brought their family or joined relatives who 
decided to give life in Mindanao a try. There were also those who were 
encouraged by stories of good life and success by earlier m igrants in 
Mindanao. Alex Bohan recounts in 1972 hearing friends from Balult Island
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visiting Sangir saying: “life is better in the Philippines. Unlike here, we 
have better opportunities there and we could buy things we w ant because 
almost everything is affordable” (Tiu, 2006:3). Despite his father’s strong 
objection, Alex took the risk and followed his friends to Balut.
Table 2. Distribution of Respondents by Reasons for Migration
4% ■ Work/Better Life
■ Join Family
Moved Along with Parents 
Adventure
■ Stories about RP
■ Visit family
■ Others
Visits from Sangir-Talaud to Mindanao are also quite common. 
Ruben M akausi, who came in 1968, wanted to discover w hether w hat was 
said about Mindanao was true.29 M igration will also be induced through 
regular trips back home and visits by families and friends from home. Some 
of these visits led to perm anent settlem ent. Yunita for instance, m et her 
husband while visiting in 2000 and has not gone back to Sangir since 
then.30
Aside from economic pursuits, Mindanao also a ttracted young 
Indonesians to study in local universities and schools. As early as the 
1930s, young Indonesians were enrolled in schools in Mindanao (Asmardi, 
1998: 13). One of these students is the grandparent of Mayor Alex Wangkay 
(or popularly known as the singer Zander Khan) of the M unicipality of Jose 
Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, who came in 1938 to study and settled in 
Mindanao.
The border also became convenient escape routes for Indonesians in 
times of conflict and trouble. In 1999, C hristian families in Halm ahera,
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North M aluku fled to Gian and General Santos to avoid the violent conflict 
between Muslims and Christians. One of these escapees was, in fact, a 
returnee to Gian having decided to move to Halm ahera a year before the 
war. At the height of the East Timor conflict, four East Timorese refugees 
landed in Mindanao through the route from North Sulawesi and Sangir- 
Talaud Islands (Cabusao, 1999:12).
Not all those who cross the border from Sangir-Talaud archipelago, 
however, decide to stay in Mindanao; m any moves back and forth and 
maximize the benefits of both sides of the border. The expression “perut di 
Philipina, kaki di Indonesia” (literally, one’s stomach is in the Philippines, 
while one’s foot is planted in Indonesia) best captures the lives of shuttle 
traders and m igrants in this border region. The residents of the contested 
island of Palm as,31 for instance, sells their m arine and copra produce to 
General Santos City and Davao and their earnings in tu rn  are used to buy 
basic commodities, which are comparatively lower than  those sold in the 
nearest m arket in Talaud Island or Manado (Layuck, 2001). Trade in 
earlier tim es was conducted through b a rte r but because of the fluctuation 
in the copra prices it became unpopular. The proximity of the archipelago to 
Mindanao has made residents dependent on basic goods from Mindanao, 
such as rice, sugar, coffee and other daily needs. To a large extent, the 
economy of the island is organized towards Mindanao ra ther than  
Indonesia’s centers of commerce in North Sulawesi. This explains why the 
Philippine currency is commonly used in Palmas, ra ther than  the 
Indonesian rupiah.
Cross-border trade is also a m ain source of livelihood for a num ber of 
shuttle traders in a number of islands in Sangir-Talaud archipelago. 
Household goods from Philippines are fam iliar items in local m arkets in 
Tahuna, Marore, and Tina-kareng. These m arkets do not only serve local 
clients but also resellers which trade the products to m arkets in m ainland 
North and South Sulawesi. One local newspaper reported th a t Philippine
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products reach as far Jak arta  and Surabaya, where they fetch a price four 
times higher than  in Sangir m arkets (“Berburu Rupiah,” 2006). These 
traders who ply back and forth to Mindanao also serve as sources of news 
from home and m aintain linkages across the sea.
There are also families who shuttle between Mindanao and 
Indonesia, whose children studies in Mindanao but earn a living in 
Indonesia. The Manabong family, for instance, are based in Mindanao 
during school days and on breaks, retu rns home to fish and do business in 
Tahuna (Santosa & Setyahadi, 2009). It is said th a t it is more profitable to 
fish in Indonesia than  in Mindanao because the catch is much greater a t a 
much shorter period in the sea. The quality of education is the prim ary 
reason why they make the travel to Mindanao. At the Manabong home, it is 
common for the children to use five different languages: English, Tagalog, 
Visayan, Indonesian, and Sangir.
The ease in the mobility of the Sangir-Talauds to Mindanao is 
facilitated by the lack or absence of real m aritim e border control from the 
American colonial period to the present. Like their ancestors, the Sangir- 
Talauds in the beginning of the tw entieth  century crossed to Mindanao 
using traditional sailboats, such as perahu  and bote. If the wind is going 
northwest, it would take around two to three days to complete the voyage 
from the Sangir-Talaud area to the nearest islands in southeastern 
Mindanao. Otherwise, it would take a week for the whole trip, such as w hat 
is described below by Pilipus Ase, who along with other 30 males, travelled 
in 1949 from Talaud to Cape San Agustin:
If there is wind, then the trip  takes two days and two nights; 
but if there is no wind, then we ju s t float (iutaw-lutaw ) on the 
sea, and it might take one week. We do not use the oars because 
we ju s t wait for the wind. It is very tiring to use the oars as our 
destination was very far (Tiu, 2006:5-6).
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The introduction of motorized boat shortened the trip, such as the journey 
from Sangir to Balut Island to about three to four hours ride. When 
commercial shipping between North Sulawesi and Mindanao became active, 
some m igrants would hop in commercial fishing boats and enjoy a free ride 
to General Santos City, the main port of call in southeastern Mindanao for 
most commercial ships.
Most of the m igrants enter M indanao through the twin islands of 
Balut and Sarangani, Glan, Cape San Agustin, and Jose Abad Santos. In 
recent years, however, General Santos City has been added as a key entry 
point. One family in Samal Island said they navigated directly to the island 
from Sangir. From these varied points, the Sangir-Talauds move to areas 
where they could find jobs and more often, moving several tim es during 
their lifetime.
In earlier periods, the Sangir-Talauds would often sail to Mindanao 
in groups of 20 to 30 as narrated  in the account below:
Since 1912, they have been coming sporadically to the 
Philippines on their sailboats, each with a capacity of from 10 to 
20 persons. They usually come during the period from July to 
December when the southern Mindanao w eather is favorable. 
They arrive in groups of about 40 persons, each with a leader 
and an interpreter who knows English or a local dialect. With 
favorable strong winds, they easily negotiate the sea between 
Marore Island and Sarangani Islands, a distance of 40 nautical 
miles in a m atter of four to six hours. From Sarangani, they 
proceed to Gian or Kiamba in Cotabato or to the coastal towns, 
along the Davao Gulf (Espino, 1952:3)
Alex Bohan relates the same experience when he came in 1972. He said he 
traveled together with twenty other people using a kum pit (traditionally, 
boat fitted w ith sails but are now installed with motor), which took them 
two weeks to sail because of bad w eather (Tiu, 2006).
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Males are usually the first one to move out first and followed later by 
their families and friends and sometimes, whole families moving in a 
boatload or two (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:81-94). In the 2002 survey, around 
74% of the Indonesia-born respondents were male and single at the time of 
their entry, while the rest came with their families. Tauhar arrived in Gian 
when he was eight months old with his whole family in 1967.32 After 
establishing themselves in the area, family, friends and kinfolk joins them. 
This is quite evident in the clustering of m igrants according to kinship or 
common origin-village, particularly in Sarangani and Balut Islands. As 
Cullam ar-Tan has observed in late 1980s and which rem ains true in 2002, 
the sitio Pakeluaso in Balut are home to people from Kawaluso, a small 
island north of Sangir; while most come from Marore in Sitio Sarangani 
(1989:94).
In most instances of border crossings, very few of m igrants will carry 
passports or even border crossing cards. From 1900s to around the late 
1950s, the Sangir-Talauds freely entered Mindanao without worrying about 
immigration procedures or rules. In some instances during this period, the 
leaders of boats carrying Indonesians would have a letter coming from their 
local government official stating the purpose of their visit, such as the one 
below:
Las Palmas 
September 15, 1946
To whom it may concern:
This is to certify that Paul Terengganun together with 46 other 
men aboard sailboat “Sum bala” wish to barter a t Davao City 
about 15 days. Their products are m ats and little copra.
Yours truly,
(Sgd.) J.P. Lantaa
Mayor of Palm as (Espino, 1952:3)
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An immigration agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines 
was signed in 1956 which allowed residents of the border region to stay or 
trade across the border for 30 days by presenting a border-crossing card 
(see Chapter IV). Despite such procedures, however, most m igrants from 
Sangir-Talaud were “undocumented.” Eighty-five percent of survey 
respondents revealed they did not have any travel documents w ith them 
when they moved to Mindanao. While only th irteen percent said they have 
passports and two percent with border crossing cards. These documents are 
barely significant among the respondents as not one of them  experienced 
being questioned about their lack of documents either by local police in 
their area or even by officers of border crossing stations.
Life in th e  M argins
The border may have no walls or guards but together w ith the 
institution of citizenship, its power to classify those who belong or not in the 
nation-state becomes a potent force in relegating those who cross illegally in 
the m argins, with no rights and space. Illegal border crossers, however, are 
active agents in this process as they find ways to overcome the restrictions 
of illegality and lead productive lives.
The issue of illegality among the Sangir-Talauds did not come up 
until the 1950s, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In their everyday 
interactions with Filipino communities, their presence was not much an 
issue as well. As illegal m igrants, however, they are one of the most 
m arginalized in the state. Despite this, many Sangir-Talauds have 
integrated fairly well and the border region of Mindanao has become their 
home. They have well adapted to the local culture and lifestyle. In General 
Santos City, for instance, “karaoke” singing is quite common on weekends, 
a known favorite pastime of Filipinos. Most of them  speak the local 
languages fluently; some even are multi-lingual.
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Education and Social Mobility
Very few of the Sangir-Talauds, in all age groups, completed prim ary 
and secondary education as reflected in Table 3. University graduates are 
rare. As illegal m igrants, many of the m igrant families do not have access 
to education. They could not enroll their children in Philippine schools since 
they are required to submit birth  records of children and residence 
certificates of parents. Most Indonesians do not register their children upon 
b irth  for fear of being identified as illegal settlers and for lack of 
information on the process. Some Indonesians though are able to enroll 
their children in Philippine schools by using fake documents. One parent in 
Norallah said he registered during the 1998 election so he could get a 
voter’s certificate, which he used as proof of residence when he enrolled his 
children.
Table 3. Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education
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□ Secondary Incomplete
■ Secondary Complete
□ Technical School
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□ University Complete
■ Literacy Class
Access to education is further compounded by the capacity of parents 
to send their children to school. W ith most families not having regular 
source of income, the education of their children becomes a least priority. In 
response to th is problem, the Indonesian Consulate established a num ber of 
Indonesian schools in several areas. The quality of education though is way 
beyond standard  such th a t Grade 9 graduates of Indonesian schools are
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classified only as grade 2 students in Philippine schools. Classes are held 
three times a week and 4 hours a day. S tudents from all levels share one 
classroom and at times, the same lessons. The teachers are also not well 
trained.
Image 2. Children of Sangir-Talaud settlers attending a prim ary school 
supported hy the Indonesian Consulate in Davao City.
Work and Employment
Lacking with the necessary education, many Sangir-Talauds are 
consigned to manual work throughout their life and one of the poorest of 
the poor in Mindanao. Of the 281 respondents and family members who 
reported they have work, around 43% are farmers, laborers, and rice mill 
workers (see Table 4). There is a small community of Sangir-Talauds 
working in a big m ultinational farm in Tupi. A num ber of these farmers 
started  as workers for the early Filipino settlers during the American 
colonization program filling in the scarce labor resource. Some would be 
able to develop a very good relation w ith their employers and end up as 
trusted  caretakers of farms, rice mills and coconut plantations. For 
example, the Sangir care taker of a rice mill in Esperanza, Isulan have 
worked there for 31 years. All of the rice mills and farm s visited between
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2002 and 2005 in Isulan, Davao, Norallah, and Ezperanza were managed 
and m anned solely by Sangir-Talaud m igrants. The Sangir-Talauds are 
known for being obedient, reliable and apolitical employees. One village 
councilor in Gian, who would not w ant to be named, said he worries more 
when the Sangirs interact with other Filipino employees because they 
adapt their bad work ethics.
Table 4. Distribution of Respondents by Type of Work
□ Fisherman
■ Laborer
□ Farmer
□ Domestic Help
■ Driver
□ Fishing Industry
■ Others
Bram a Ricardo’s story is a good example of this case.33 He has been 
working for ten years as tenant of a three hectare coconut plantation in 
Samal, an island across Davao City. Since his employer does not reside in 
the area, he takes care of everything, including sending his employer’s 
share of the income from copra sale through a friend in the island. Early in 
2008, his employer sold the land to a Filipino based in Tagum, Davao del 
Sur, which is a few hours’ drive south of Davao City. He was kept as the 
tenan t and m aintained the same arrangem ent even though he only met his 
new employer a few times. In Achmat Sanduka case, because of his good 
relations with his employer, he was allowed to build a house in his 
employer’s property in Gen. Santos City. It has been the family’s home for 
quite some time now. His wife m aintains a small store in front of their 
house.
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Image 3. A bunkhouse-turned-fam ily residences for Sangir- 
Talaud rice mill workers in Norallah, South Cotabato.
Life is tough in the rice mills and small commercial farms. Aside 
from the seasonal nature of work, m igrants are dependent on the generosity 
of the owner. The common set-up in the rice mills is th a t m igrants are 
allowed to build houses or occupy the bunk houses w ithin the compound of 
rice mills. The bunkhouse, composed of 3-6 individual rooms, measuring 
around 5x5 meters, was initially m eant for workers staying for the harvest 
season. It was common to find a family occupying or single workers sharing 
a room designed for one person. The care taker oversees the overall 
m anagem ent of the compound. This set-up allows the owner a steady and 
on-site supply of workers. During the planting season, most of the m igrants 
work in the farms of their employer or nearby farms. By harvest time, they 
take tu rns in harvesting and m anning the rice mills, which entails working 
until midnight. On lean months, some of the male family members find 
tem porary work in the fishing industry or as independent fishermen. They 
earn around P2,500 (A$63)34 for around two months during the harvest 
season and around P500 (A$13) per m onth the rest of the year. Others 
would save the rice grain they received as payment for farm work to see 
them through the lean months. In dire times, many would opt to take a loan 
from their employer to be paid come harvest time.
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Aside from farming, around 40% of respondents are small-time 
fisherm en earning around P I ,000-2,000 (A$25-50) per month. While a small 
percentage (7%)35 have found employment in the multi-million dollar tuna 
industry based in General Santos City, mainly composed of younger 
generations or recent m igrants. Based on a Philippine-Indonesian in ter­
government agreement, a t least th irty  percent of the crew of vessels fishing 
in Indonesian waters m ust be Indonesians. These are mostly filled in by 
m igrants based in Mindanao, who takes on a variety of roles in the 
industry. Some work on major shipping boats supplying fish to tuna 
canneries; while others work for pump boat operators mainly catching 
yellow fin tuna m eant for processing plants or export. M igrants who are 
able to speak Indonesian fluently are hired as interpreters, particularly in 
vessels th a t dock in Indonesian ports or fish in Indonesian waters. There 
are reports of m igrants employed by small time operators who do not have 
the necessary papers to fish in Indonesian waters. Popularly known as two- 
flag ships, once they are in Indonesian waters, they fly the Indonesian flag 
and the Indonesian crew takes on the lead. The income of these seafarers is 
highly variable, averaging around P4,000 (A$100) per month. Their income 
depends on their sharing arrangem ent between the fishing company or 
pump boat owner and the crew, computed based on the total value of the 
fish haul less the cost of food and petrol. The Philippines and Indonesia 
have agreed on a new fishing consortium in March 2009 but have yet to 
firm up the details.
The Sangir-Talauds also find work as sales ladies, housekeepers, 
drivers, office clerks, and buy and sell businessmen. According to Non, the 
M atutum  Hotel of Gen. Santos City were mostly staffed by Sangir-Talaud 
m igrants in the 1970s and 80s.36 At one time, the city health  center had an 
Indonesian nurse.
Even with their low income m any Sangir-Talauds prefer to stay in 
Mindanao. Here a t least, they say, they have work and earn no m atter how
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small it is. For many farm ers and fishermen, particularly those who have 
been in Mindanao for long, shared th a t they have been used to the life here 
and going back to Indonesia would mean starting over all again. For a 
num ber of m igrants, they survive by moving from one place to another and 
hopping from one job to the next. As Alex Boham says, “kung m ahinay ang 
trabaho, balhin” (If work was slow, move out) (Tiu, 2006:3). Indeed, at least 
41% of the respondents moved a t least twice in their lifetime. Abner 
Papuling, for instance has worked in six places since coming in 1967, from 
Balut, he went to Punsad and stayed for two years, Kiamba, three years, 
Dumuluk, eight years, Margos, five years and back to Punsad, where he has 
lived since 1984. Ernesto Jum aat, on other hand, has been moving back and 
forth between Punsad, Tam plasa for five years, before moving to Tupi and 
later, Nibong. For some m igrants, the onset of a family life means having a 
sedentary life, but for others, having a food to eat takes precedence than 
staying perm anently in a place. Helm a’s four children, for example, were 
born in four different places as he continually seeks work.
C om m unity Life, Clusters, and N etw orks
The community or cluster affiliation is a significant aspect of the 
Sangir-Talauds. As cited earlier, there is a tendency among the Sangir- 
Talauds to live in groups and among themselves. The communities or 
clusters in Gian, Balut and Sarangani are generally organized along origin 
area. The composition is more heterogeneous in other communities, perhaps 
because of the seasonal nature of work, such as in the case of rice mill 
communities. Except for a few, most of the Sangirs tend live among 
them selves and separate from the cluster of Filipino houses in the 
villages.37
Living in clusters is one mechanism  of m igrants to cope with their 
illegal sta tu s in Mindanao. By living together, they are able to share 
information and resources, as well as develop a network of friends and
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relatives whom they can run for help in times of crisis or trouble. From the 
moment they leave their home islands to their first day in Mindanao, many 
of the m igrants find help or assistance from their relatives and friends. 
Medellion Camalo for instance, traveled to Mindanao with his uncle. Upon 
arrival, his relatives provided accommodation and helped him find work. 
Employment opportunities are easily dissem inated w ithin the community. 
Ms. Regina Belascuarin,38 a Filipino rice mill owner in Norallah, shares 
th a t every time they need additional workers, the Sangir-Talauds living in 
their compound are immediately able to find compatriots from other towns 
to fill in the vacancy. Information on immigration policies, surveys, and 
other stories spreads out easily. Respondents for this study for instance, 
were not difficult to find (contrary to w hat was expected of illegal migrants) 
since when Indonesian residents heard about the interviews and thinking it 
was a government survey, they started  to turn  up in the houses of local 
leaders. It was only later when they realized th a t the interview was for an 
academic exercise.
The Indonesian Consulate in Davao City has used the clusters as the 
basic organization of Indonesian communities in Mindanao. Each group of 
clusters, organized by m unicipality or city, has a designated liaison officer. 
They serve as the main contact person of the Consulate and in charge of 
dissem inating information on consular activities, elections, immigration, 
and other issues. The liaison officer also coordinates with local government 
officials and the Filipino community. Pak Benny,39 the liaison officer for 
Gian, has been helping the local government and Immigration satellite 
office in encouraging fellow m igrants to register, acting sometime as 
interpreter, and assisting in filling up the form. Prior to his appointm ent in 
1993, he has been working since 1968 as a caretaker of a coconut 
plantation. He receives a small honorarium for his work with the 
Consulate.
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Image 4. A gathering of Sangir-Talaud youths from different parts of 
Southeastern Mindanao in General Santos City organized by the local 
church.
The social relations and networks within and among the clusters are 
further strengthened by local Indonesian Christian churches, which are 
almost always present in each of the clusters. There are very few Muslims 
Indonesians and most are based in Kiamba. The Indonesian Christian 
m inistry started  almost at the same time American Protestant missionaries 
started  proselytizing in M indanao.40 The Indonesian churches are member 
churches of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). In 
cities like Davao and General Santos, the Indonesians share with Filipino 
Christians the use of UCCP churches for their worship services. The 
churches run  literacy classes and promote the use of the Sangir language in 
communities. The regular youth encounters organized by local churches 
give young Indonesians to know one another and build linkages.
C onclusion
The geopolitical transform ation of Mindanao started  by the Spanish 
was completed by the Americans, along with the settlem ent and 
development of the area. The Americans put in place the necessary
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political-legal institutions of immigration and customs to support it borders 
in Mindanao. Yet, the border was not fully able to seal off the area or hinder 
the movement of goods and people. Rather than  highlight political 
subdivision, the border drew attention to the differences in economic 
opportunity and better living conditions between Mindanao and the Sangir- 
Talaud archipelago. The border, then, became more of a line th a t needs to 
be crossed and exploited.
Driven by drought, disease, and lack of employment, many Sangir- 
Talauds found their way back to Mindanao at the beginning of American 
settlem ent and colonization of the area. Unaware of their ancestors’ early 
presence in the area, many would replant and reoccupy the areas their 
ancestors once trod. In turn, became the silent and undocumented “pioneer 
se ttlers” of Mindanao. They prepared the ground for succeeding movements 
th a t persisted to the postcolonial period. Many would settle perm anently in 
Mindanao, while some continually crossed the border to maximize w hat is 
offered on both sides.
As illegal settlers in Mindanao, the Sangir -T alauds do not have 
access to basic services such as education. Many, thus, rem ained m anual 
workers throughout their life. It seems this pattern  will continue as their 
m any young Sangir-Talauds are unschooled. In coping w ith their illegal and 
m arginal position, many would depend on their relatives, friends, and 
kinfolk for help. A num ber also establish good relations with their Filipino 
employers and relations.
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C hapter IV
A m bivalent State, R esolu te Border Region: 
The Sangir-Talauds and th e P h ilip p in e State
The politics of exclusion at the border does not only occur within the 
juridical construction of belongingness as embodied in the institution of 
citizenship. This also occurs through a discursive process of representing 
transgressive movements at the border as th rea ts to the security of the 
state. States construct profiles of border crossers according to their country 
of origin. Because of such th reats, states are able to justify their policies of 
closure and exclusion. This becomes problematic at state  border regions 
where local communities do not necessarily share the sentim ents and 
perspective of the center or their origin state. This chapter examines how 
the Philippine state has dealt with the Sangir-Talauds in Mindanao and the 
corresponding response of the Sangir-Talauds and host local communities. 
The first section explores the policies developed by the Philippines on the 
Sangir-Talauds. While the long historical relations with Indonesia were the 
basis of initial attem pt to develop policies on its borders, this was 
superseded later by the security concerns a t the border. There were two 
instances when the presence of the Sangir-Talauds was associated with 
supposed national security th rea ts em anating from the border. The weak 
bases of these threats, however, failed to make a dent on the lived reality of 
the border. The policies implemented also did not meet its desired 
objectives, partly because of adm inistrative and fiscal lim itations and the 
challenges posed by m aritim e geography. The Sangir-Talauds responded to 
these policies through avoidance, evasion, and half-hearted compliance. The 
second section examines how local communities and local governments 
hosting the Sangir-Talauds perceived and received the policy responses of 
the national government. There is a disjunction between the national
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agenda and popular responses at the ground thereby lim iting the power of 
sta te  intervention on its border regions. This illustrates th a t local 
communities and sta te  institutions are critical actors, as well, in 
(re)defining border spaces.
In this chapter, the national identity of the Sangir-Talauds as 
Indonesians is used to refer to them. This is to avoid confusions on the term  
used in state  policies, pronouncements, and newspaper reports.
C om m unists, Terrorists, and M igrants in  the P eriphery
After Indonesia’s sovereignty was recognized by the international 
community in December 1949, the Philippines and Indonesia immediately 
established diplomatic relations and this was m arked by a treaty  of 
friendship on 21 June 1951. One of the first issues the two states had to 
deal was the illegal flow of goods and people at the border region of North 
Sulawesi and Mindanao. Both states were housing illegal entrants, 
although there were relatively more illegal Indonesian m igrants in 
Mindanao than  Filipinos in North Sulawesi. Recognizing the historical 
relations between the two states and within its border regions, the 
Philippines' initial policy proposal was for the legalization of Indonesian 
residents in the Philippines through legislation (Ramos, et.al, 1969: 80). 
The legislative bill introduced by then Congressman Diosdado Macapagal 
did not prosper. By 1954, a delegation of Philippine and Indonesian 
officials m et in Manila to discuss the issue, particularly on the reciprocal 
legalization and repatriation of irregular m igrants from both countries. 
This led to the signing of an agreem ent on immigration in Ja k a rta  on 4 July 
1956. The agreem ent came into force in 1961 after the ratification of the 
two states, which included the orderly legalization of residence of illegal 
m igrants who pass the criteria set by the two states and repatriation for 
those who fail.
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One of the significant aspects of the agreem ent was the system of 
border crossing control. Under this system, nationals of both countries 
residing within the designated border areas may freely enter and travel 
w ithin the border areas for purposes of business, visit to relatives, religious 
worship or pleasure. Nationals availing of the system are issued border­
crossing cards and this will be presented upon entry and exit in the border 
crossing stations in key islands in the border area. Border Committees were 
also established in each country to oversee the implementation of the 
agreem ent, as well as, to m aintain the operations of the stations.
It would take a while, however before the legalization and 
repatriation took place. For one, the Philippines did not have accurate 
information on the num ber of Indonesian im m igrants in the country and 
who among them should stay or be repatriated. It was estim ated th a t there 
were around 6,000 Indonesians in Mindanao at th a t time. A series of 
negotiations between the countries ensued. By 1963, Indonesia started 
repatriating  its citizens. At the end of 1965, a total of 3,225 Indonesians 
were repatriated.
The historical relations and am ity between the Philippines and 
Indonesia, however, took a side step when anti-communist groups in the 
Philippines drew public attention to the increasing public support of then 
Indonesian President Sukarno for communism and preference for China 
and Soviet Union. Soon, the national dailies were filled with alleged threats 
posed by Communist Indonesia. “Ganjang Mindanao,” thus exclaims one of 
the Philippine dailies in 1964 on the alleged plot of Sukarno to “crush” 
(ganjang) Mindanao after Indonesia is able to annex British Borneo 
(Barranco, 1964:5). I t was alleged th a t Sukarno plan to revive the 
M ajapahit empire and expands Indonesia’s territory to include Borneo, 
Mindanao and eventually the whole Philippines.
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The Indonesian m igrants’ presence in Mindanao was inextricably 
linked to this threat. Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal was quoted 
as saying: “...the illegal entry of Indonesians into the country constitutes a 
bigger and more immediate th rea t to Philippine security than  the explosive 
situation in Vietnam ” (Ramos, Djaafra, & Iljas, 1969:59). The alleged plot to 
annex the Philippines, according to Philippine Congressman Ramon 
Bagatsing, will not be done through m ilitary invasion but by infiltration 
and subversion (Ty, 1965:30). Bagatsing, a known staunch anti-communist 
advocate, further alleged this plot will be achieved through the help of 
Indonesian communist agents, many of whom are already in Mindanao (Ty, 
1965:30) and with the collusion of Moscow-trained Indonesian embassy 
staff (Albert, 1965:2). Sukarno was reported to be “subtlety enlarging the 
Indonesian population in Mindanao to a degree to which they can 
eventually challenge or confront constituted Philippine authority on many 
m atters such as labor, trade, industry, civil rights, and even dictate 
municipal or provincial adm inistration” (Barranco, 1964:5). The report 
further said th a t “some Philippine officials are emasculated in their task  to 
enforce the laws against the Indonesians because the Indonesians are good­
paying tenants in the apartm ent houses or buildings for ren t belonging to 
some Philippine officials” (Barranco, 1964:5).
The scenario of m igrants being part or used for their home sta te’s 
in terests is not w ithout basis according to congress officials and newspaper 
reports. Czechoslovakia’s Sudentenland was easily annexed by Hitler 
(which Bagatsing likened to Sukarno) through the help of a large num ber of 
Germans in the area (Rama, 1965:6). N earer to home, the Japanese 
invaders during the World W ar II knew their targets well in the Philippines 
supposedly because of the information gathered by highly trained Japanese 
intelligence officers disguised as street peddlers and poor m igrants (Tutay, 
1965:82). Like the Indonesians, the Japanese were very peaceful and law- 
abiding m igrants in the Philippines. Yet, they turned up to be the opposite 
during the war. Therefore, given th a t many of the Indonesian m igrants are
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“card-carrying communists,” according to army intelligence, (Ty, 1965:3) 
their role in the infiltration and subversion of Mindanao is not far-fetched. 
This suspicion was shared by then Davao Governor Almendras, who was 
quoted saying:
“Red infiltrators can disguise themselves as plain farmers, 
fishermen, or traders. Who can tell w hether an Indon 
[Indonesian] who has ju s t landed, say, in Sarangani is a trader 
or a Communist propagandist? ... Their coming to the country 
may be for no other purpose than  to look for employment. Five 
years ago it was their only purpose. But I do not believe it now.
(Ty, 1965:4)
Aside from the security th rea t posed by the Indonesians, they were 
also deemed as carriers of diseases. Apparently, because of their ignorance 
and poverty, they do not practice proper hygiene and sanitation (Espino, 
1952:3). The Indonesians were also taught to cause the outbreak of 
smallpox in Balut and Sarangani Islands in 1925. O ther reports also 
mentioned tha t the Indonesians were taking away jobs from local workers 
and occupying lands illegally (De Gracia, 1963:4). Because of these 
perceived threats, calls were made to secure the border by building up a 
naval facility in Cotabato and the immediate repatriation of the 
Indonesians.
There were dissonant voices, however, in the stories peddled by an ti­
communist supporters, both at the national and local level. Congressman 
Rogaciano Mercado labeled the plot as “notorious hoax” (Ramos, Djaafra, & 
Iljas, 1969:63). The Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces also 
denied the presence of spies in Mindanao (Tupas, 1965:23). On the border 
island of the municipality of Sarangani, the acting Mayor a t the time, 
Alberto Olarte, said much of w hat have been said about the Indonesians 
was fiction (Tupas, 1965:21). He said th a t if indeed the Indonesians are 
infiltrators, the country have been infiltrated for centuries.
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Filipino residents in Balut and Sarangani Islands also did not view 
the Indonesians infiltrators or communists in the 1960s; nor were the 
Indonesians viewed as labor competitors or depriving the Filipinos land, 
based on a study of Campado (1990:88). The study also shows th a t the 
community was not aware of any Indonesian trying to propagate the 
communist ideology or discuss with them anything about communism 
(Campado, 1990:101). There were two Indonesians students allegedly who 
escaped to Balut the Communist persecution after Sukarno’s downfall but 
not much was heard of them  as they were described as silent and harm less 
(Campado, 1990:102).
The hysterics about communism and the alleged Indonesian plot to 
annex the Philippines has less to do with the presence of Indonesian 
m igrants in Mindanao than  the geopolitics of the time. Sukarno’s 
preference over the communist Russia and China has visibly irked the 
democratic Americans. The Philippines, being the United S tate’s loyal ally 
in Asia, became its prim ary propaganda machine to counter Sukarno’s 
moves in the region. The Indonesian m igrants in Mindanao were the most 
visible m anifestation of the th rea t communist Indonesia posed to the 
Philippines. By bringing them in the grand conspiracy, the legislators were 
not only able to concretize the th reat, but also played out th a t the th rea t is 
already w ithin the state.
The Indonesians repeated transgressions of the border is a powerful 
simile to the propensity to create disturbance and subversion within the 
state. As the “communist others,” they were fair contrasts to the democratic 
loving Filipinos. The problem with this narrative is th a t it assumes a 
correspondence between the Indonesian state  and the people within its 
territory. In ter alia, by being part of the territory, one is assumed to be 
communist. A more nuanced look, however, a t the Indonesians in Mindanao 
will show it was quite uncertain th a t the Indonesian state  would have 
considerable influence on a community of Indonesians in the Philippines
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who have been in the area prior to Indonesia’s independence. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the m igrants as instigators and propaganda machines is 
fallible given the lack of education and “ignorance” supposedly of these 
m igrants, most of which are simple farm ers and fishermen.
The feebleness of this supposed security th rea t is shown by the 
abrupt end of public uproar after Sukarno’s fall from presidency. The th rea t 
discourse, however, provided momentum to the negotiations between the 
Philippines and Indonesia on the mobility of their nationals in their 
common border regions. In 1974, the Philippines and Indonesia signed a 
new Border Crossing Agreement in Manado, Indonesia. Under the revised 
agreement, which came into force on 11 March 1975, the border areas were 
expanded and included Tawi-Tawi on the Philippine side. A border crossing 
station was also established in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi. Likewise, the rules for 
cargoes and m erchant ships were also delineated.
Image 5. The Philippine Border Crossing Station in Batuganding, 
Sarangani Island.
While an innovative concept a t the time in border control, the 
creation of border crossing stations was beset with financial and logistical
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problems which resulted in its failure. Each station is supposed to be 
m anned by officers from the Bureau of Customs, Immigration, Q uarantine, 
and the Coast Guard. Because of lack of funds, it was only the Coast Guard 
th a t m aintains staff in the station. Thus, the stations function more of a 
police patrol post ra ther than  the multi-functions they were originally 
envisioned. At present only one station in each state is functioning 
(Batuganding Station in Balut Island and Marore Station in Sangir-Talaud 
area). Moreover, according to former Davao City Immigration Chief, Talib 
Abdulaup,41 the physical location and the lack of efficient transportation to 
and from the stations make it difficult for both states to m aintain and 
entice personnel to be assigned in the stations. Batuganding, for example, 
does not have electricity and communication facilities. During a visit to the 
Batuganding border crossing station in 2002, there was only one motorized 
boat for use to patrol the sea, which was not working at the time. Hence, 
the patrolling of the sea had to wait for some time.
It is not only the logistical requirem ents th a t made the border 
crossing system unfeasible. Unlike land borders where all roads 
presumably lead to a border checkpoint, there are no such arrangem ents in 
m aritim e highways. Anybody can load and unload at any points in the 
massive length of Mindanao coasts. It would only perhaps the highly 
conscientious border crosser who would go up the Batuganding border 
crossing station, as it is situated on a hill, to stop by en route to General 
Santos City and register his/her entry. Moreover, there are no significant 
repercussions involved by not registering w ith the border crossing stations. 
The th rea t of repatriation was not effective since m any of those who were 
sent home were back the following day in Mindanao. There was a joke 
among local residents, for instance, th a t while the Philippine navy boats 
were busy unloading the repatriated  m igrants in Sangir Island, some of 
them hopped on nearby boats on their way back to Mindanao.
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After the 1950s and 1960s events, the Indonesian m igrant 
community in Mindanao would fade from national limelight, emerging 
again in the late 1990s. As part of the Bureau of Im m igration’s (BI) efforts 
to address hum an trafficking, irregular migration, and stateless persons in 
1999, then Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez ordered a survey to determine 
how many of the Indonesians wanted to stay in the Philippines either as 
Filipino citizens or perm anent residents or be repatriated. The BI 
considered granting citizenship or residency sta tus to the Indonesians in 
Mindanao. The results of the survey showed about 54% of the Indonesian 
m igrants wish to legalize their stay, 26% w ant to go home, and 17% were 
undecided. Commissioner Rodriguez was quoted as favoring the granting of 
perm anent residency to the Indonesians as their presence could be easily 
and effectively monitored (Papa, 1999:16).
Along with the efforts to solve the sta tus of Indonesians in Mindanao, 
as well as other im m igrants in the country, the BI also lobbied with 
Congress the passage of a new immigration and naturalization law to 
strengthen government’s action against hum an smugglers and irregular 
migrants. The proposed law includes the creation of an Immigration and 
N aturalization Commission th a t will have the power to grant Filipino 
citizenship to qualified applicants. Under Commonwealth Act No. 473, only 
the courts could decide on applications for naturalization. This has made 
the acquisition of citizenship in the Philippines quite tedious and costly, 
which ordinary im m igrants may not be able to afford. Thus, the proposal 
extending citizenship to Indonesian m igrants will not be feasible if existing 
laws will not be amended.
In 8 June 2001, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 
9139, otherwise known as the “Adm inistrative N aturalization Law of 2000”. 
The law opened the possibility of acquiring Philippine citizenship through 
adm inistrative proceedings. While it was a welcome legislation for many 
m igrants in the country, the law however, caters more to the moneyed
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m igrants. The application fee for the head of family alone costs P40,000 and 
if the application is approved, the naturalization fee is P100,000. Add to 
th is the fees of the dependents which totals to P60,000 per person. 
Citizenship was certainly a very expensive option for most of the Sangir- 
Talauds whose income barely covers their daily needs. Perm anent 
tem porariness is perhaps a better option. The leadership change in the BI 
would tem porarily stall the regularization of Indonesian migrants. The plan 
was revived only after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack of New York 
City.
The ensuing global w ar against terrorism  brought the Philippine 
state  back to its borders with Indonesia, including Malaysia, to contain the 
terrorist groups lurking w ithin the Islamic radical movements in Mindanao 
and across the border. Intelligence reports revealed th a t the Indonesian- 
based terror group, Jem aah Islamiyah (JI), has entered Mindanao and set 
up terrorist cells in the area (“Indon make most,” 2004:A17; “BI Steps up,” 
2005; “Not all Jis, 2005:A2).” The porous borders of Mindanao were said to 
be the entry points of the terror group.
Reminiscent of the 1960s communist hysteria, it did not take long 
before the Indonesian m igrants in Mindanao were linked with the Islamic 
radicals. Immigration and m ilitary officials were quoted as saying th a t 
terrorists might use the m igrants in order to seek cover or elude detection. 
These fears were bolstered with the arrest of four Indonesians who were 
implicated in the bombing of F itm art Shopping Center in General Santos 
City in April 2002. While recognizing the fact th a t m any of the Indonesians 
have been in the area for more than  fifty years and although direct links 
between the m igrants and JI has yet to be established, government officials 
insisted on the “possibilities” of involvement.
Local and national officials called for the registration of Indonesian 
m igrants to preempt terrorist infiltration and monitor the movements of J I
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members. Indonesian Consul Bambang Gunawan, in an interview, 
vehemently denied the connection of Indonesian m igrants in Mindanao 
with the JI  (“Not all J Is ,” 2005). He said th a t the m igrants are not known to 
be troublemakers. In a press release, he belatedly cautioned Philippine 
officials to be more circumspect in tagging JI  as Indonesians, since 
according to him, it is a transnational group with members from Malaysia, 
Philippines and other Southeast Asian country (“Not all JIs ,” 2005). He 
further said th a t th is kind of stereotyping is a serious concern to Indonesia 
and affects Indonesian businessm en and m igrants in Mindanao. Despite 
the protestation of Indonesia, the whole registration program as discussed 
below was implemented as part of the anti-terror m easure of the Philippine 
government and later as part of a four-million-Euro-project to secure the 
backdoor of the Philippines (“BI’s top m an,” 2005: A6).
In November 2002, Philippine immigration agencies led a crackdown 
on Indonesian m igrants (Rivera, 2002:A6). These crackdowns, however, 
were hardly felt on the ground. No house to house checks was conducted. 
The BI deployed field personnel and alien control officers to conduct 
information drives to encourage the m igrants to secure registration papers 
and apply for the Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). The ACR is a 
certificate issued to foreign nationals attesting  to their legal stay in the 
country. It serves as an official identification of m igrants when dealing with 
government offices, enrolling in Philippine schools, or in seeking work 
permits. The Indonesian Consulate and some local governments assisted in 
the campaign. To help facilitate the registration of Indonesians, a satellite 
immigration office was established in Gian in 10 February 2003.
Simultaneous with these activities, the Bureau of Immigration and 
the Indonesian Consulate in Davao City and Embassy in Manila started  to 
discuss the options to resolve the question on the legalization of the 
migrants. This came after plans to repatria te  the m igrants was stalled 
because both governments lacked funds to finance such effort. The
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Indonesian Embassy also protested the plan because aside from facilitating 
the repatriation, they also have to deal with the resettlem ent of m igrants, 
which may take time and is quite costly (“Govt eyes,” 2002).
In January  2004, Commissioner Domingo was replaced by 
Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, who continued the registration of 
m igrants and negotiation with the Indonesian officials. Commissioner 
Fernandez fine-tuned the registration process and proposed to lower the fee 
rate  of the ACR to the Departm ent of Justice (DOJ) so it would be more 
affordable for the Indonesians. In January  2005, the DOJ agreed to reduce 
the ACR fee to 61% lower than  the normal rate for the acquisition of ACR 
(see Table 5). The Indonesian government appreciated the gesture of the 
Justice Departm ent. To implement the registration process, Commissioner 
Fernandez issued Memorandum Order No. AFFJR 05-003 on 4 January  
2005.
Table 5. Comparative Schedule of Rates (in Philippine Peso) 
for Alien Certificate of Registration
Item
R ate
R egular Indonesian
ACR above 14 yrs 1,050 410
ACR below 14 yrs 550 210
Annual Renewal Fee 340 150
Source: Memorandum Order No. AFFJR 05-003 and schedule of
immigration fees a t www.immigration.gov.ph/immigration_fees.php.
In order to help the Indonesian m igrants register, the Indonesian 
government allotted around $100,000 to pay for their registration fees but 
stressed th a t the m igrants themselves will pay for the renewal fees.42 The 
registration however, was limited only to a certain sector of Indonesian 
m igrants. Under existing laws only Indonesians born in the Philippines 
could apply for the ACR. After the BI completes the registration of 
Indonesians born in the Philippines, they will assess whether they will
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extend the same privilege to those born outside of the country. The 
Indonesian Consulate hopes th a t the BI will decide in favor of the 
rem aining unregistered m igrants.
In a symbolic turn-over ceremony on 1 May 2005 in Davao City, the 
first set of Indonesian m igrants num bering to 1,730 received their ACRs 
from Commissioner Alipio. During the ceremony, Indonesian Charge d’ 
Affairs Sanusi said the Indonesian government is very thankful to the 
Philippine government for helping their nationals legalize their stay 
(Allada, 2005:23). By August 2005, a total of 2,641 Indonesians were issued 
their ACRs. Associate Commissioner Franklin  L ittaua however, noted th a t 
the Indonesians have not shown considerable in terest in the registration 
process. By 2009, there were barely 4,000 who have registered for the ACR. 
The BI office in Gian registered 3,125 from 2003-2008, with the biggest 
num ber of registrants in 2005 at 1,944. After which, the numbers dwindled 
to 512 in 2006, 174 (2007) and down to 29 by 2008.
The declining in terest in the regularization program could be 
attributed to the location and limited num ber of immigration offices in 
Mindanao. The Immigration office in Gian, for instance, caters for m igrants 
based in Sarangani Province. Those who are residing, for example, in 
Kiamba had to travel a considerable distance to register and add to it, the 
cost of travel. More than  the accessibility of immigration offices, however, it 
is the accrued value of registering th a t plays a significant role in 
determining a m igrant’s decision to fork out the extra time and cost. There 
are no significant changes in their socio-political position in the community 
even with an ACR. Almost all have lived in Mindanao without these papers. 
They are hired w hether or not, they have the ACRs. Most of their children 
do not go to school so the need for the ACR is not a necessity. Moreover, the 
ACR is only a tem porary respite from illegality and it does not significantly 
change the m igrant’s legal sta tus w ithin the state. The failure to renew the 
ACR the following year m eans a m igrant is back to his previous status,
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illegal and undocumented. In addition, since the ACR can only be issued to 
Indonesians born in the Philippines, a significant portion of the m igrants 
are excluded from the process and yet, they continue to rem ain in the 
country without fear of arrest or detention. This further dampens the 
enthusiasm  of many local born m igrants to register and be documented.
The O ther A ctors in the Borders
Aside from the m igrants and the national governments of states, 
there are other actors in the border who put their claims on the border. 
These are the local government institutions and communities which have 
largely been absent in crafting national policies on the border but directly 
and on a daily basis in teract with m igrants and the border. The relative 
tolerance exhibited by local government units to Indonesian m igrants 
w ithin their jurisdictions has made the m igrants’ stay and integration in 
the community less difficult. In the case of the municipality of Gian, for 
instance, the Indonesians are able to access basic social services, including 
education and health , provided for free by the local government. Such 
instances of drifting into the spaces of the “citizen,” blur the neat 
delineation of who is legal and illegal, citizen and m igrant.
Similar to the 1960’s incidents, the local governments and 
communities did not readily share the central s ta te ’s association of the 
m igrants with terrorism . Local officials from Norallah, South Cotabato and 
Isulan and Ezperanza, Sultan K udarat seemed unperturbed. Isulan Mayor 
Ernesto M atias,43 for instance, said th a t the th rea ts  posed by local 
secessionist groups in Mindanao are far greater than  the Indonesian 
m igrants. Esperanza Mayor Romulo Latog44 also shared th a t the 
Indonesians are peace-loving people and have never been involved in crimes 
w ithin his jurisdiction. Given their length of stay in Mindanao, many 
doubts how strong are the m igrants’ linkages w ith radical groups based in 
Indonesia, more so th a t almost all Indonesian m igrants are Christian.
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There is only a small percentage of Muslims. Again, the particularities of 
the m igrants’ origin place and religious affiliation are overlooked to drive 
the sta te’s analogy of Indonesians as terrorists.
Noticeable among the LGUs is the common shared tolerance, if not 
lack of interest, on the Indonesian communities within their jurisdiction, 
partly because they have been peaceful members of the community. Many 
of the local officials, for instance, in Gian, from the village head to the 
municipal leaders, grew up with Indonesian neighbors and classmates. The 
lack of interest also stems from the shared perception th a t the Indonesian 
m igrants are the prim ary concern of the BI and not the interest of the local 
government. Except for the municipalities of Gian and Sarangani, all of the 
local officials interviewed for this study from Isulan, Norallah, Esperanza, 
Davao, and General Santos do not have information on the num ber and 
location of Indonesians in the area. Most of the stories shared during the 
interviews were anecdotal. When an interview was scheduled with the 
Mayor of General Santos City, the whole office staff did not know where to 
refer the researcher. The Vice Mayor promptly told the researcher to go to 
the local immigration office since she does not have any knowledge on the 
Indonesians in the city. Mayor Latog, on the other hand, could not exactly 
pinpoint where the Indonesians reside in his municipality. All the local 
officials, however, acknowledged the contribution of the Indonesians to the 
local economy. Mayor M atias disclosed th a t m any of the rice mills in his 
jurisdiction are dependent on Indonesian workers and many of the 
employers prefer they rem ain illegal so they do not need to pay higher 
wages.
The dynamics and overall scenario a t the border region between the 
Philippines and Indonesia is set to change again with the establishm ent of 
cross-border cooperation between the municipalities of Gian, Sarangani and 
Jose Abad Santos [which comprise the Jose Abad Santos-Glan-Sarangani 
Cooperation Triangle (JAGS-CT)l w ith their counterparts in North
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Sulawesi and the Sangir-Talaud Regencies in areas of trade, tourism, and 
im m igration .45 The project, which is still in its infancy, is envisioned to lead 
to growth area in this border region. Already, there are on-going processes 
of harmonizing rules and regulations affecting the movement of goods, 
people and services, which will facilitate among others the monitoring of 
cross-border migration. It is too early to define w hat would be ultim ate 
outcome of the project, but if the plans will push through, one thing is 
certain; it will reconfigure the border region itself.
C onclusion
The representation of m igrants in public discourse as harbingers of 
threats, disease, and insecurity is a compelling rationale for states to close 
its borders and exclude border crossers. This becomes problematic, however, 
when m igrants are profiled as th reats merely on the basis of their origin 
states. In the case of the Indonesians in Mindanao, the two major instances, 
they classified as th rea ts were rooted from their being Indonesians. 
Perhaps, when the state talked about their local identity as Sangir-Talauds, 
the dissonance of being represented as communists and Islamic terrorists 
would have been easily revealed. Moreover, the narrative of th reats finds 
weak footing as local communities and governments do not necessarily 
share the perspective of the center or the national government.
The Philippine sta te ’s policies on its border regions have been erratic, 
inconsistent, and reactive, such as in the case of the Indonesian settlers in 
Mindanao. While early efforts to settle the mobility of goods and people in 
its border region with Indonesia, the succeeding efforts of the state  has 
largely been as a result of a response to a purported th rea t at its border. As 
a result, it has not truly able to find a lasting solution to the presence of 
Indonesians in Mindanao. Meanwhile, the Indonesians or the Sangir- 
Talauds continue to cross the border and enjoy w hatever it could offer them.
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C hapter V
A V iew  from  th e Periphery: 
Sum m ary and C onclusion
The border, as the m anifestation and expressions of sta te ’s territoriality, 
has largely been studied from the perspective of the state. It has been 
represented as static, fixed, and the sole domain of states. The body of 
literature th a t emerged in the 1990s suggested a shift in perspective on the 
borders by giving voices to actors in the border other than  the state. It is 
argued th a t by privileging the narratives of border regions and its 
inhabitants, a different understanding of the border as a zone of 
interactions, accommodation, and contestation comes to the fore. The lived 
reality at the border hardly represents w hat the state conceives and 
perceives the border to be.
This study attem pted to take on this call by examining the socio- 
historical dynamics of the border region between the Philippines and 
Indonesia, while drawing analogies and lessons from other border regions 
in Southeast Asia. The study argued th a t the formation of nation-states and 
demarcation of territories excluded and redefined the space and place of 
communities at the border regions of states. The border communities, 
however, were active actors in this process by resisting, challenging, or 
m anipulating the barriers imposed by the state. The study tried to address 
the questions: how did the construction of the modern nation-state and 
border redefine the dynamics and locations of people within a border 
region? How the barriers erected as result of nation-building were used, 
m anipulated, contested, and challenged by people in the border region? 
How did such acts shape and give m eaning to border spaces?
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The study addressed these questions by first examining the political 
organization of pre-colonial polities in Southeast Asia and territoriality  of 
the modern nation-states. The pre-colonial polities were organized based on 
personal relations and alliances, with influence as m easure of power ra ther 
than  territory. This is contrast to the modern nation-state system 
introduced by colonialism which organized polities according to territory. 
The concept of the border in pre-colonial period implied more of the 
extremities of kingdoms ra ther than  as lines separating peoples and states.
Colonialism redrew the political space of Southeast Asia and 
established territories and states. In the process, communities at the border 
were separated from their kin and relations and w hat used to be communal 
spaces of interactions became sites of division between states. The 
postcolonial successor sta te  reinforced th is division through the institutions 
of immigration and citizenship. Border communities, however, resisted and 
challenged the imposition of boundaries by ignoring, m anipulating, and 
maximizing w hat the border can offer. As such, borders in Southeast Asia 
rem ain sites of intense interactions and exchanges.
Second, the study examined in detail the dynamics of border 
formation through a case study of the border region of the Philippines and 
Indonesia, in particular, the narratives of the Sangir-Talauds whose lives 
traverse this border region. In the second chapter, it is shown th a t this 
border region was part of the m aritim e zone of the Sulu-Sulawesi area in 
the pre-colonial period. The polities in the area were segmented, 
decentralized, and fluid. While trade was a prim ary factor in the 
interconnectedness of the various kingdoms in th is body of water, familial 
relations because of extensive interm arriages was also a significant linking 
element. The Sangir-Talauds were one of the groups in the subject border 
region of this study. They had settlem ents in Sarangani Island and the 
Davao Gulf areas of Mindanao. Being a t the crossroads of competing powers 
and major port-polities, the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms political, economic,
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and familial relations extend from Ternate to Magindanao. Family 
narratives and folklore suggest th a t the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms had very 
close relations with Mindanao.
Colonial projects reconfigured th is political space by altering the 
traditional trading network through redirecting them towards the economic 
centers of the colony; thereby, cutting off the m ain thread tha t links the 
various polities in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. The political structure was 
redefined through the formation of adm inistrative territorial units. The 
Sangir-Talauds, therefore, will be divided between those who would be left 
behind in the Spanish occupied Mindanao and the Dutch-occupied Sangir- 
Talaud archipelago. The boundaries between the colonial powers rem ained 
porous and communities resisted the line through smuggling and piracy. 
The Sangir-Talauds continued to move in and out of Mindanao, albeit on a 
much lower scale.
The Sangir-Talauds returned to Mindanao beginning in 1900 as 
discussed in the th ird  chapter. This time, however, their entry was defined 
according to the political and juridical requirem ents of the state. W ithout 
the required documents, they were classified as illegals and therefore, with 
no corresponding rights. Drought, na tu ra l disasters, and lim itations of 
employment options prompted many Sangir-Talauds to cross the border 
and find a living in Mindanao. The border between the Philippines and 
Indonesia signified not only as a political demarcation but also as a line of 
division between better opportunities and the absence of it. The first set of 
m igrants in the 1900s took part in the settlem ent of Mindanao under the 
American colonial government. Their stories, however, will be faintly heard 
and documented. Many early settlers, as well as, those who followed later 
built their lives in Mindanao and considered it as their home.
Others, however, would crisscross the border as they reaped the 
benefits of both sides of this border region. The shuttle traders and
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m igrants redefined the border as site of control as they move back and forth 
to exploit the differences in price of goods and educational opportunities in 
Mindanao. The ease in the mobility of both settlers and shuttle m igrants to 
Mindanao puts into question whether there a border exists at all between 
the Philippines and Indonesia.
The state may be absent in the border but its power to exclude 
through the institution of citizenship th a t assigns illegal settlers to a life of 
with no rights and privileges. The study shows, however, again th a t the 
Sangir-Talauds are not passive recipient of th is process. Through the 
effective use of collective support systems, such as family and social 
networks, they are able to overcome the lim itations imposed by illegality. 
The tacit and subtle support provided by host local Filipino communities 
and governments also made their integration in Mindanao much easier.
Exclusion also takes shape in the construction of m igrants as th reats 
to the security of the state. The problem with this construct is th a t 
m igrants are profiled based on their origin sta te  and glosses over the 
complexities, variety, and nuances of communities w ithin a given state. In 
the border, these complexities become more real as border communities 
often do not share the persuasions or in terest of the center. This is 
particularly true for those lives depend on the other side of the border. In 
the case of the Sangir-Talauds, they have been represented in public 
discourse as communists and terrorists prim arily because they came from 
Indonesia, which is deemed as source of such threats. As shown in chapter 
five, the possibility of these m igrants as communists and terrorists is quite 
remote since many have spent their lives in Mindanao and connection with 
their ‘home’ state is weak. To associate Islamic fundam entalism  with a 
C hristian community, as in the case of Sangir-Talauds, for example, is quite 
ridiculous.
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The policy responses of the postcolonial Philippine state on the 
Sangir-Talauds have failed in part, because of adm inistrative and financial 
lim itations, as well as the challenges imposed by m aritim e geography. The 
sta te ’s inconsistency in implementing the policies also doomed its 
effectiveness. As expected, the responses of Sangir-Talauds settlers towards 
these policies have also been inconsistent and erratic. Many continue with 
their everyday living without due regard to the existing policies.
In conclusion, the study has shown th a t the formation of nation­
states and imposition of borders has redefined the place of communities at 
the border regions as they become members of different states, with 
differing economies and politics. This does not mean, however, th a t the 
socio-historical dynamics have been completely altered. Border 
communities defied the lines of separation by continuing on with their lives, 
m aintaining linkages across the border, and m anipulate whatever benefits 
th a t both sides offer. The pre-colonial practices of mobility and exchange at 
the border region continue to exist, albeit, has evolved into different forms.
Borders serve more as zone of exchange, accommodation, and 
interactions than  as sites of closure and control. People in the border make 
use of the opportunities it offers and build their lives and histories around 
it. The state, therefore, becomes only one of the actors who compete for its 
space and place in the border. In some instances, the state is even absent in 
the border further giving credence to the artificiality of the border.
As local governments a t the border regions of Indonesia and the 
Philippines begin to redefine the border spaces separating them through 
cross-border cooperation and creation of a borderless economic zone, the 
notion of bounded collectivities will be further put to test.
100
N o t e s
C hapter I
1. This is a slightly revised version of H orstm ann’s earlier paper published in 
Antropologi Indonesia (2002).
2. Under the NEP, the educational and socio-economic condition of a large 
num ber of Malaysians significantly improved and many of which favored work 
in modern industries.
3. Shaari bin Baba’s study shows th a t according to police sources, between 1983 
and 2005 crimes committed by foreign workers hardly exceeded three percent 
of all crimes committed annually and th a t there was little evidence to show 
th a t foreign workers are responsible for rising crime rate (as quoted in (Mak, 
2006:16).
C hapter II
4. The territorial boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines were based 
on the 1898 Treaty of Paris when Spain ceded the Philippines to the United 
States. The boundary between North Borneo and the Philippines were fixed in 
a treaty  between Great Britain and the United States in 1930. The Philippines 
and Indonesia have yet to formally agree on the delimitation of their maritime 
boundaries based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.
5. Politically, the two islands comprise the municipality of Sarangani under the 
province of Davao Del Sur. The m unicipality is not part of and should not be 
confused with the Province of Sarangani.
6. In local practice and in th is study as well, Sangir is used interchangeably with 
Sangihe.
7. VOC stands for Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East India 
Company), while TANAP means Towards a New Age for Partnership. TANAP 
is a joint initiative of institutions based in Netherlands and the country’s 
former colonies to promote, among others, research and archival studies on the 
yet unstudied voluminous VOC records. For more information on the program, 
visit: http://www.tanap.net/.
8. From the Arabic word silsilah  which means chain or link (Saleeby, 1976:1).
9. These scholars are: Alex Ulaen, who is from Talaud Island and works with the 
Sam Ratulangi University in Manado; Domingo Non, a local historian based at 
the Mindanao State University, General Santos City; and Shinzo Hayase, a 
Japanese professor a t Osaka City University, who has w ritten extensively on 
the history of Davao and Southern Mindanao.
10. Hayase (2007) mentioned in his work th a t the tarsilas are currently being used 
to resolve territorial dispute in the Sangir-Talaud Islands (94). This is quite 
problematic since the genealogies were not w ritten to identify “territories” but 
mainly for tracing lineage of families who might be located in different places. 
As the succeeding discussion will show the concept of territory was quite far 
from the minds of the early settlers in the Sulu-Sulawesi m aritim e zone. The 
genealogies merely identity where family members are located but do not imply 
territorial ownership or property rights.
11. The boat makers of N anusa Island in the Talaud area are said to export boats 
to Sangir, North Sulawesi, and Ternate (Henley, 2005:81; Forrest, 1971:324). 
The tradition of boat building in Sangir continues up to present, albeit the 
design have changed considerably from what has Forrest observed during his 
visit (Ulaen, 2003:136). In term s of knowledge of the sea, Lapian notes, for 
instance, tha t the Sangirese would have at least eighteen term s for wind types 
(Lapian, 2008:16).
101
12. The area where the Sultanate of Magindanao was located in pre-colonial Sulu- 
Sulawesi world is now the present Cotabato City. It should be not be confused 
with the Magindanao ethnic group and the present Province of Magindanao.
13. Spain abandoned Zamboanga in 1663 because of the Koxinga th rea t to Manila. 
According to Majul, for the next fifty years, Spain did not appear in Muslim 
Mindanao in any m ilitary capacity (1973:166).
14. The use of the name “Cotabato” in th is legend suggests th a t it might have been 
revised by natives of the Sangir Island, perhaps to conform to the modern name 
of w hat used to be the powerful Sultanate of Magindanao. The name Cotabato 
came into use only after 1861 when the Spanish colonial government created 
the politico-military government of Mindanao and Sulu. Saleeby notes th a t the 
present Cotabato City covers the former settlem ents of Magindanao and 
Siangan (1976:3).
15. There are several versions of this legend (at least five in Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 
1999) perhaps because of the process of oral transm ission from one generation 
to another.
16. The date of P anurat’s entry is quite problematic since presumably, he is 
Muslim because of his knowledge in Arabic, but Islam did not arrive in Sangir 
until the 15th century based on the two points of references on the history of 
Islam in the area, Magindanao and Ternate. Islam was introduced in 
Magindanao in early 15th century, while it would reach Ternate on the last 
quarter of the century.
17. Another story relates th a t the name Sarangani came from Saranganing, a 
Sangir voyager who traded with the kingdom of Buayan in earlier times.
18. The burial site of Datu P anurat can still be seen today beside ARCAL’s garage 
at Batuganding Point, Sarangani Island. An aged Kalachuci tree m arks the 
site, which is a traditional burial sign for the communities in the Sangir- 
Talaud Islands. This practice it seems is not unique to Sangirese. Saleeby 
mentioned a sim ilar practice in Magindano where trees are often planted 
around the tomb. During the fieldwork in Balut Island in 2002, Sangir 
residents mentioned such trees around tombs of early m igrants.
19. According to Laarhoven, in some Dutch and Spanish maps, Sarangani is 
m istaken as K andahar because the island is home to the King of Kandahar 
(1989:233).
20. In another narrative, Mehelangi is the son of Syarif M aulana II who married 
Pedima, a princess from Mindanao (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999). He married 
Princess Bembulaeng of Kendahe and became Rajah of Kendahe. He was 
succeeded by Raja Buisang.
21. See for instance the genealogies from page 44-56 in Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 
1999.
22. Majul said the Barham an was heard as Sultan as early as 1678 and died on 6 
July  1699 based on Dutch sources (1973:29).
23. Hayase erred in his 2007 work when he interpreted these spheres of influence 
as five layers of territorial concepts of Magindanao (2007:61-64). As evident in 
the discussion, the modern concept of territory was far from the minds of 
Magindanao rulers, even the famous Sultan Q udarat. According to Laarhoven, 
after Q udarat took control of the Davao Gulf region, the em battled Datu 
Buisan continued to rule in the area. This arrangem ent is ‘ambiguous’, as 
argued by Hayase (2007:67), th a t is, if it is perceived from the modern notions 
of territory and state.
24. Forrest records a sim ilar account; M akalindi’s name is noted as Maholanding 
(1971:252). M akalindi’s title as first Sultan of Sangir, however, is quite 
problematic. Sangir never developed into a full Sultanate. There never was a 
single unified Sangir kingdom because of internal division and fierce 
competitions among the kingdoms in the area. It could have been th a t in order 
to make the m arriage look more prestigious, it was recorded as a m arriage 
between two Sultanates. Barham an might have m arried the sister of the 
gugugu of the King of Tabukan as reported in Laarhoven’s work.
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In the genealogy of Datu of Pangyan, Gian, Sarangani Province, Basing’s father 
is listed as Sultan Mohammad Tacumang of Lumaog, Tawokang, Indonesia. 
Instead of Basing, the genealogy uses the name Umbaseng. There is some error 
in the date in this genealogy. It said th a t Basing’s parents m arried in 1675, 
when this is the year Basing m arried Barham an. In Hayase’s 2007 work, he 
noted th a t it was the year Basing’s parents moved to Gian. Morever, the story 
of Basing’s siblings contradicts the story in the Magindanao geneaology which 
states th a t her brother was a Rajah in Sangir. In the Gian genealogy, her 
siblings were based in Gian (the eldest, Sarael), Balut Island and Tuguisa, 
Kiamba. Sarael’s children spread out, perhaps after m arriage, to Madawong 
(Davao del Norte), Jose Abad Santos, Batulaki (Gian), and Lumawog 
(Tawokang, Indonesia). At least two in succeeding generations would 
interm arry with women of M agindanaon ancestry .The current datu, Datu of 
Pangyan, M astura Salisipan, who is the source for this genealogy, is of Sangil 
ancestry and traces their origin to Ternate, Sangir Island, Lumaog, Rumban, 
and Lerong, Indonesia. Non notes th a t it was Datu M astura who assisted in 
securing some of the genealogies (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999:46).
Chapter III
25. In an interview in 15 April 2002, Rosiana, one of the daughters of Benjamin 
Mahaling, recounted th a t their family came in August 1918. Being 11 years 
old at the time, she could not rem ember the particularities of their move.
26. Interviewed on 17 April 2002 in Laker, Balut Island.
27. In Macario Tiu’s work (2006), he mentioned about Rosa de Arce vda de Parsaso, 
daughter of Venancio de Arce, having an Indonesian stepmother.
28. Interview with Dr. Tranquilino Ruiz, Gen. Santos City, 16 June 2009.
29. Interviewed on 25 April 2002, General Santos City.
30. Interviewed on 18 April 2002, Patirang, Balut Island.
31. The Palmas Island, as referred to in the Philippines or Pulau Miangas in 
Indonesia, is the nearest island off the Indonesian border with southeastern 
Mindanao. It is situated approximately 47 nautical miles east-northeast of 
Sarangani Island and 78 nautical miles to one of M indanao’s key cities, Davao. 
M iangas lies about 75 nautical miles from Tahuna Regency, which has political 
adm inistrative jurisdiction over the island, and about 324 miles from Manado. 
A boat trip from Palmas Island to Cape San Agustin, Davao del Norte takes 
about three hours, while it is a three-day trip  to reach the Manado aboard a 
passenger ferry th a t plies the route every fortnight (Velasco, 2007:7). While 
sovereignty over Palmas Island was awarded to Indonesia in 1925 after a 
landm ark arbitration proceeding between then colonial powers in the area, the 
United States and Netherlands, it rem ains to be a subject of dispute between 
the two successor states, the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively.
32. Interviewed on 20 April 2002, Gian.
33. Interviewed on 10 June 2009 in Sam al Island, Davao.
34. The conversion rate used: A$1=P40.
35. At the time of the survey, there were only a few families at home, thus the 
small number of respondents. According to local informants, Gen. Santos City 
has one of the biggest communities of m igrants.
36. Interviewed on 17 June 2009, Mindanao State University, Gen. Santos City.
37. In an informal discussion with Alex Ulaen in July 2003, he observed th a t even 
in Manado, Sangirs tend to live in clusters separate from the local community 
and outside of the city.
38. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Norallah, South Cotabato.
39. Interviewed on 15 May 2005 and 16 June 2009.
40. According to Valentin Sitoy (1981:147-175), the first phase of American 
Protestant missionary work in the Philippines was spearheaded by the
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Christian Missionary Alliance (CMA) in 1900 in Sulu and Zamboanga. The 
missionary work in the Davao Gulf areas occurred between 1903 and 1915. 
Some of the Sangir-Talaud residents are CMA members.
C hapter IV
41. Interviewed on 15 September 2000, Davao City.
42. Based on an interview with Consul Bambang Gunawan on 16 May 2005 at the 
Indonesian Consulate, Davao City.
43. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat.
44. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
45. For more information, see varied reports on the websites of the Mindanao 
Economic Development Council (www.medco.gov.ph/) and the provincial 
government of Sarangani (www.sarangani.gov.ph/).
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